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SUBCONTRACTING AGREEMENTS
IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY:
WOELKE & ROMERO "FRAMES" CONNELL*
Jan Stiglitz*
INTRODUCTION

In order to further their efforts to organize and to represent

employees in the construction industry, unions have sought to include
clauses in collective bargaining agreements which require that the terms
of the agreements be imposed on any subcontractor who is retained by a
construction employer to do unit work. These so-called subcontracting
clauses are a very effective tool for the preservation and even acquisition

of work for union members.
Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act' generally prohibits agreements which require an employer to refrain from doing business
with another employer.2 But a proviso to §8(e), (known as the construc* Copyright © 1982, by Jan Stiglitz
** Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. B.A., S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo,

1970; J.D., Albany Law School, 1975; LL.M. Harvard Law School, 1980.
I. The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §158(e) (1976) provides as
follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease
doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into
heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and void: Provided,That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement
between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to
the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction,
alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work: Providedfurther,
That for the purpose of this subsection and subsection (b)(4) (B) of this section the
terms "any employer," "any person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting
commerce," and "any person" when used in relation to the terms "any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer," "any other employer," or "any other person" shall not
include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor, working on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing
parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry:
Providedfurther, That nothing in this Act shall prohibit the enforcement of any
agreement which is within the foregoing exception.
2. The agreements prohibited by §8(e) are often referred to as "hot cargo" agreements.
The term seems to have originated from the widespread use of these agreements by the Teamsters Union. See Note, Hot-Cargo Agreements In The ConstructionIndustry: Restraints On
SubcontractingUnder The Proviso To Section 8(e), 1981 Duke L. J. 141.
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tion industry proviso), precludes its applicaton to agreements between

employers, and employees in the construction industry relating to work
performed, at a construction site.
In Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
100, 3

the Supreme Court had occasion to construe the construction

industry proviso and to review the legality of a subcontracting clause
that h4d been challenged as a violation of §§ I and 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. 4 The Supreme Court held that the clause in question,
while within the express terms of the construction industry proviso to

§8(e), was. not to be sheltered by this proviso.5 As a result, the subcon-

tracting clause was held subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws. 6
Decause the union in Connell did not represent any of Connell's
employees (nor did they seek to represent any of Connell's employees) 7,
a question remained as to the extent to which Connell applied in the
traditional employer-employee context. 8 In Woelke & Romero Framing,
Inc. v. NationalLabor Relations Board,9 the Supreme Court answered
that question and unanimously held that broad subcontracting clauses
negotiated in the context of a collective bargaining relationship were
sheltered by the construction industry proviso to §8(e).10

The Supreme Court's ability to achieve unanimity in such a controversial area of labor law is suprising. Equally surprising is the result. The
decision in Wolke & Romero is a departure from recent Supreme Court

decisions which have frustrated the interests of unions in the construc-

tion industry."I This article will examine the Court's decision in Wolke &

Romero; what it holds and what it portends for labor relations in the
construction industry.
3. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
4. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) current version at 15 U.S.C. §§I and 2 (1976)] (hereinafter referred
to as the Sherman Act).
5. "We conclude that §8(e) does not allow this type of agreement." 421 U.S. at 626.
6. Id. at 635.
7. Id. at 619.
8. See Stiglitz, Union Representation in Construction: Who Makes the Choice, 18 SAN
DiEao L. REV. 583, 629 (1981).
9. 456 U.S. 645 (19821.
IQ. li. at 648.
11. Connellitself is a prime example of a decision which has troubled unions in construction by raising the specter of antitrust liability. Other significant decisions that have gone
against union interests in construction include: NLRB v. Local 103, Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335
(1978), known as Higdon,which limits the extent to which employers in construction are bound
by prehire agreements. [For additional background on Higdon and discussion of its implications see Barr & Jacobson, The Enforceability of Construction Industry PrehireAgreements
After Higdon, 3 INDUS. REL. L. J. 517 (1979); King & LaVaute, Current Trends in Construction
Industry Labor Relations-The Double-Breasted Contractor and the Prehire Contract, 29
SYRACUSE L. REV. 901 (1978); Comment, The NLRA's Forbidden Fruit: Valid But Unen-
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The article will also examine several questions which were raised, if
not directly answered by this decision: can unions picket and use coer-

cive tactics to obtain subcontracting clauses;12 can unions picket and use
3
coercive tactics to enforce subcontracting clauses;' are subcontracting
construction industry proviso when included
agreements sheltered by the
14
in §8(f) prehire contracts.

Since the decision in Woelke deals with an interpretation of the
scope of the Connell decision, Part One of the article will be a review of
Connell. Part Two will then concern itself with the specific labor disputes
that led to the Supreme Court's opinion in Woelke. This will include a
review of the Board and 9th Circuit opinions in Woelke as well a review

of Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB 5, a D.C. Circuit court decision that
involved one of the original companion cases to Woelke. Part Three will

be an analysis of the opinion in Woelke. Part Four will deal with some of
the questions that remain open after Woelke.
PART I
Connell
In 1970, Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 100 was attempting to6
organize the mechanical and plumbing contractors in the Dallas area.'
forceable Concessions to the ConstructionIndustry, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 288 (1978); Comment,
An Examination of Section 8(0 of the NationalLabor Relations Act, 24 VILL. L. REV. 931
(1978-79).] South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627, International Union of Operating
Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1975), known as Kiewit, which allows construction employers to avoid
union contracts by operating as a double breasted enterprise, i.e., separate union and nonunion
corporations controlled by one interest, [for additional background on Kiewit, see generally,
Bornstein, The Emerging Law of the "Double-Breasted"Operationin the Construction Industry, 28 LAB. L. J. 77 (Feb. 1977); King & LaVaute, supra; Comment, DualCompanies- When
Does a Union Have the Right to Expanded Representation, 12 U.S.F. L.J. 89 (1977)]; and
NLRB v. Enterprise Association of Pipefitters, Local 638,429 U.S. 507 (1977), which limited the
enforceability of a concededly valid §8(e) work preservation agreement, [see generally, Leslie,
Right to Control:A Study in Secondary Boycotts and Labor Antitrust, 89 HARV. L. REV. 904
(1976); Yates and Kaplan, PrefabricatedWork in Construction:New Technology Versus Work
Preservation- Who Controls the Job Site?, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 270 (1979); Comment, A Basis
for CongressionalReexamination of the Proviso to Section 8(e) of the NationalLabor Relations Act: Discriminatory Legislation, 1978 DET. C.L. REV. 689; Comment, The NLRA's
Forbidden Fruit: Valid But Unenforceable Concessions to the Construction Industry, 47 U.
CIN. L. REv. 288 (1978)].
12. See infra notes 243-69 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 270-80 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 215-42 and accompanying text.
15. 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981), reh'g. denied, 457
U.S. I 111 (1982).
16. The background information on Connell is taken from the opinion of the 5th Circuit,
483 F.2d 1154 (1973). As that opinion indicates, the particular dispute between Connell Construction Co., Inc. and Local 100 was but one phase of the struggle between trade unions and
the construction industry in the area. Id. at 1157.
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Since these contractors usually were retained as subcontractors on proj-

ects let to general contracting firms, the union decided to secure union
work by mounting a campaign against the general contractors. 7 The
strategy was simple and effective. The union reasoned that if most or all
of the general contractors were obligated to subcontract with union

mechanical and plumbing firms, it would gain jobs for its members.

Either all of the work would go to firns with whom it already had labor
agreements, or the recalcitrant firms would sign agreements with the
union to enable them to acquire work.
The success of the strategy depended on Local 100's ability to exert

pressure on general contractors. Here again, the union was in a tactically

good position. First, there was always the possibility that general contractors would be willing to voluntarily agree to enter into such agreements.' 8 Second, the reluctant contractors could be subjected to unlimited picketing; since Local 100 did not seek to represent any of the

general contractors' employees the §8(b)(7)19 ban on organizational picketing would not apply.20

Connell Construction, a general contractor, found itself to be the

object of a campaign to force it to enter into a union-only subcontracting

17. The basic organization of a construction project is a tiered system of contracts and
subcontracts. One general contractor will be given the responsibility for completing the work
according to plans and specifications. This contractor, in turn, will subcontract portions of the
work to other firms who specialize in a particular kind of construction work, such as plumbing.
A brief description of the structure of the construction industry can be found at Stiglitz, supra,
note 8, at 585. For a more comprehensive picture of the industry, see W. HABER & H. LEVINSON, LABOR RELATIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE BUILDING TRADES (1956); D.Q. MILLS,
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND MANPOWER INCONSTRUCTION 4 (1972); [D.Q. Mills, Construction,
in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 60 (Somers ed. 1980)].
18. While voluntary compliance might not be likely, the possibility is not farfetched. An
employer with good union relations would enhance its pro-union bona fides with such an
agreement. Moreover, this agreement would not entail direct costs. Yet, agreements of this type
would clearly limit the general contractor's choice of subcontractor which might result in the
need to submit a higher bid on the project (assuming that a nonunion subcontractor might be
able to underbid a union subcontractor on the work in question). Subcontract prices are passed
on to the owner in a construction project as part of the general contractor's bid. But if the bid is
too high, the general contractor may not receive the project. Thus, the contractor who signed
such an agreement might lose flexibility and yield a competitive advantage to general contractors who were not so restricted.
19. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1976). Section 8(b)(7)(C) prohibits
picketing where "an object" is recognitional unless a representation petition is filed within thirty
days.
20. In a previous organizational drive, the Dallas Building Trades Council had sought
such a subcontracting 'agreement from a general contractor who employed members of unions
represented by the Council. A NLRB order to cease from picketing because of a §8(b)(7)(C)
violation was enforced by the D.C. Circuit. Dallas Building Trades v. NLRB, 396 F.2d 677
(1968). The Council, thereafter, decided to picket only general contractors who did not employ
union members. 483 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1973).
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agreement. 2' Since Connell employed no plumbers, the picketing could
not be enjoined under §8(b)(7). Connell did attempt to have the Board

determine that the agreement violated §8(e), but this strategy was foreclosed by the fact that the General Counsel would not have issued a

complaint. 22

Connell petitioned to have a Texas state court enjoin the picketing
as a violation of the antitrust laws of Texas, the Texas "Right to Work"
laws and the Sherman Antitrust Act, but the Union was able to remove
the case to Federal District Court.23 When injunctive relief was denied,
24
Connell was compelled by the picketing to enter into the agreement. It
did, however, continue to pursue its antitrust claims.
This was the basic controversy that the Supreme Court confronted
25
in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100.
Two fundamental issues were raised by this controversy. One involved
whether the subcontracting agreement entered into between Connell and
Local 100 was lawful under the NLRA. The second question was
whether such an agreement could be the basis of an antitrust suit.
The District Court concluded that the agreement was protected by
26
the construction industry proviso to §8(e). The District Court further
concluded that such authorization resulted in the agreement being both

The text of the proposed agreement was as follows:
WHEREAS, the contractor and the union desire to make an agreement applying
in the event of subcontracting in accordance with Section 8(e) of the Labor-Management Relations Act;
WHEREAS, it is understood that by this agreement the contractor does not
grant, nor does the union seek, recognition as the collective bargaining representative
of any employees of the signatory contractor, and
WHEREAS, it is further understood that the subcontracting limitation provided
herein applies only to mechanical work which the contractor does not perform with
his own employees but uniformly subcontracts to other firms;
THEREFORE, the contractor and the union mutually agree with respect to work
falling within the scope of this agreement that is to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting or repair of any building, structure, or other works, that if
the contractor should contract or subcontract any of the aforesaid work falling within
the normal trade jurisdiction of the union, said contractor shall contract or subcontract such work only to firms that are parties to an executed, current, collective
bargaining agreement with Local Union 100 of the United Association of Journeymen
and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry.
Id. at 1156 n.l.
22. The General Counsel had refused to issue a complaint in another situation where this
union had imposed a subcontracting agreement on a general contractor. Id. at 1158.
23. 78 L.R.R.M. 3012 (1971).
24. Id. at 3013.
25. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
26. 78 L.R.R.M. 3012, 3014. The District Court found that since the contract was protected by §8(e), picketing to secure such a contract was not unlawful. Id.
21.
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non-violative of the federal antitrust law, and not subject to any state
27
regulation.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 28 On the antitrust issue, the court

rested its decision on the fact that no "conspiracy with a non-labor
29

group" existed

and that the union was seeking "an agreement involving

a legitimate union interest."30 On the §8(e) issue, the court sidestepped. It

held that it did not have "jurisdiction to directly decide the complex
labor [law] issues .... 31
The Supreme Court reversed in what was a close 32 and controver33
sial decision. It held that the agreement was not authorized by §8(e),
and that it was subject to a challenge under the antitrust laws.
On the antitrust issue, the Court described two sources which provided labor with an exemption from the federal antitrust laws. The first
source was a "statutory" exemption contained in §§6 and 20 of the
Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 34 "These statutes declare
that labor unions are not combinations ... in restraint of trade. '35 The
Court reasoned, however, that since the statutory provisions did not

27. Id. This portion of the decision was affirmed by both the Court of Appeals, 483 F.2d
1154, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and the Supreme Court, 421 U.S. at 621.
28. 483 F.2d at 1154.
29. Id. at 1165. For an explication of the antitrust issues, see infra notes 192-94 and
accompanying text.
30. Id. at 1167.
31. Id. at 1175. The court eschewed antitrust sanctions because the agreement was either
authorized or prohibited by the NLRA and, thus, a labor law question. It declined to decide the
labor question because the case before it was premised on alleged antitrust law violations!
32. Four.Justices dissented. Justices Douglas, Marshall and Brennan joined in an opinion
written by Mr. Justice Stewart. 421 U.S. at 638. Mr. Justice Douglas also wrote a separate
dissenting opinion. Id..
33. See e.g., Bartosic, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term: The Allocation of Power in
DecidingLabor Law Policy, 62 VA. L. REV. 533, 591 (1975); Casey and Cozzillio, Labor-Antitrust: The Problems Of Connell And A Remedy That Follows Naturally, 1980 Duke L.J. 235;
Cohen, Labor Law And Antitrust Law: The Impact Of Connell Construction,PROCEEDINGS OF
N.Y.U. 32nd ANN. NATL. CONF. ON LABOR 13 (1980); Note, Labor's Antitrust Exemption After
Connell,36 OHIO ST. L.J. 852 (1975); Nash, Connell "Hot Cargo"Agreements: The Supreme
Court As Interpreted By The NLRB, 83 DICK. L. REV. 661 (1979); St. Antoine, Connell:
Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603 (1976); Stiglitz, supra, note 8;
Comment, Connell Five Years After: Labor's Antitrust Exemption And The Scope Of The
ConstructionIndustry Proviso To Section 8(e), 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 799 (1980); Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 234 (1975); Note, The Labor-Antitrust
Conflict- Connell ConstructionCompany v. Plumbersand Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,
27 BAYLOR L. REV. 812 (1975); Note, From Norris-LaGuardiato Connell- Consistency Yields
-ComprehensiveLabor Antitrust Protection,17 NEw ENG. L. REV. 845 (1982).
34. 421 U.S. at 621, citing 38 Stat. 731,738, 15 U.S.C. §17 (1976) and 29 U.S.C. §52, and
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 71, 73, 29 U.S.C. §§104, 105, 113, 1976 respectively.
35. Id. at 622.
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The Court then noted that there existed a "nonstatutory" exemption to the antitrust laws which sprang from "the strong labor policy
providing [for] the ... eliminat[ion] of competition over wages and
working conditions." 37 This exemption allowed for union-employer
agreements which might affect price competition among employers, but
it did not protect agreements to restrain competition in a business
market. 38 The agreement demanded by Local 100 was found to have
exceeded the scope of the nonstatutory exemption because it achieved
both an anticompetitive effect beyond that which was based on the
elimination of wage competition 39, and because it gave Local 100 the
4
power to control the business market. 0 The Court specifically recognized, however, that it was not facing an issue as to the scope of the
antitrust exemption which might exist had the subcontracting agreement
4
been contained in a lawful collective bargaining agreement. '
The Court then approached the §8(e) problem. Local 100 argued
subcontracting agreement with Connell was explicitly protected
the
that
by the construction industry proviso to §8(e) and, therefore, antitrust
law must defer to labor law.42 The Supreme Court rejected the argument
was not sheltered by the construction
on the grounds that the agreement
43
industry proviso to §8(e).
36. Id. citing United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
37. 421 U.S. at 622, citing Local 189, Meatcutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1975).
38. Id. at 622-23.
39. Id. at 623-24. The Court noted that a multi-employer agreement entered into between
Local 100 and the Mechanical Contractors Association of Dallas contained a "most favored
nation" clause which effectively ensured that the terms of all agreements with Local 100 would
be the same, even on subjects unrelated to wages, hours and working conditions.
40. Id. at 624-25. If Local 100 was able to impose the subcontracting agreement on
general contractors, it could eliminate certain mechanical contractors from the market by
refusing to enter into collective bargaining agreements with them.
41. Id. at 625-26. While this disclaimer related to the antitrust issue, it points out the
Court's keen awareness of the fact that Local 100 and Connell were not in a traditional
collective bargaining relationship.
42. Id. at 626.
43. Id. The Court never expressly agreed with the argument that shelter under §8(e)
would not result in potential liability under the antitrust laws. The dissenting opinion, however,
suggests that such would be the case:
It would seem necessarily to follow that conduct specifically authorized by Congress in the National Labor Relations Act could not by itself be the basis for federal
antitrust liability, unless the Court intends to return to the era when the judiciary
frustrated congressional design by determining for itself "what public policy in regard
to the industrial struggle demands." Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S.
443, 485 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also, United States v. Hutcheson, 312
219 (1941).
Id. at 648 n.8.
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The Court found that §8(e) was "part of a legislative program
designed to plug loopholes in §8(b)(4)."44 Congress apparently wanted to
proscribe agreements designed to effectuate the kind of economic coercion that was unlawful under §8(b)(4). Two provisos to §8(e) were
enacted; one for the construction industry, and one for the garment
industry. The construction industry proviso was the result of a compromise between the House bill which prohibited all hot cargo agreements, and the Senate bill which only outlawed those agreements in the
trucking industry.45
In trying to ascertain the Congressional intent behind the construction industry proviso, the Court commented upon the paucity of available information and it characterized what little history there was as "bare
references to 'the pattern of collective bargaining' in the industry."46 The
Court did suggest, however, that the construction industry proviso was
"adopted as a partial substitute for an attempt to overrule...
NLRB v.
Denver Building & Construction Trades Council. 47 The Court recognized the "problems of picketing a single nonunion subcontractor on a
multiemployer building project, and the close relationship between contractors and subcontractors at the jobsite." 48
The Court further quoted from its previous interpretation of §8(e),
enunciated in National Woodwork ManufacturersAss'n. v. NLRB,49
that the construction industry proviso was "designed to allow agreements pertaining to certain secondary activities on the construction site
because of the close community of interests there."50 The Supreme Court
also noted that other court decisions had construed the proviso as serving a more narrow function; specifically, to alleviate the friction that
might arise when union and nonunion employees worked alongside each
other.5'
44. Id. at 628. Section 8(b)(4) prohibited coercion to enforce a hot cargo agreement,
but it
did not prohibit an agreement voluntarily entered into and adhered to. Thus, a union
could

conceivably circumvent 8(b)(4)'s prohibitions if an employer acquiesced. A powerful union was

in a good position to achieve such "voluntary" compliance with an employer. Local
1976,
Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (1958). See infra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
45. 421 U.S. at 628.
46. Id. at 628-29
47. Id. at 629, citing 341 U.S. 675 (1951). The Denver Building Rades decision prohibited
unions from picketing a general contractor to force a subcontractor off ajobsite, even
where the
union had a collective bargaining agreement with the general contractor.
48. Id. at 629-30.
49. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
50. Id. at 638-39, quoted in 421 U.. at 630.
51. 421 U.S. at 630, citing Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 R2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Essex County & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters v. NLRB, 332 R2d 636 (3d
Cir. 1964),
and Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Denver Building 7Rades, 341 U.S. at 692-93.
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Local 100 was not able to relate the agreement it sought to any of
these purposes. Its agreement with Connell was not limited to jobsites
where members of Local 100 were working. Moreover, the agreement
would have allowed subcontracting to nonunion firms as long as they
were not doing unit work. Thus, Local 100 was willing to accept the
possibility of having its members work alongside nonunion workers.
The Supreme Court contrasted the construction industry proviso
with the garment industry proviso. The garment industry was specifically
exempted from the prohibitions of §8(b)(4)(B) whereas the construction
industry was not. Consequently, there was nothing to indicate that Congress wanted to give the construction unions the ability to use subcon52
tracting agreements as a broad organizational weapon: Since Local 100
was not able to relate its agreement to one of the policies behind the
proviso, the Court wai unwilling to sanction what would be "an almost
unlimited organizational weapon." 53 The Court found that one of the
major aims of the 1959 Act, which included §8(e), was to limit "top54
down" organizing.
The final argument made by Local 100 was that the labor law

remedies for §8(e) violations were exclusive and, therefore, Connell's
resort to the antitrust laws was improper. 55 The Supreme Court rejected
this argument and found no legislative history that labor law remedies
were to be exclusive in this situation, or that allowing antitrust remedies
56
would be "inconsistent with the remedial scheme of the NLRA."
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart focused on this last
issue. He argued that antitrust remedies were expressly eschewed in 1947

when Taft-Hartley restricted union activity. 57 The 1959 amendments
which contained §8(e) also expanded the labor law damage remedy to

protect those in Connell's position. 58 Again, antitrust sanctions for
52. 421 U.S. at 630.
53. Id. at 631.
54. These limits on the economic pressure unions may use in aid of their organizational campaigns would be undermined seriously if the proviso to §8(e) were construed
to allow unions to seek subcontracting agreements, at large, from any general contractor vulnerable to picketing. Absent a clear indication that Congress intended to leave
such a glaring loophole in its restrictions on "top-down" organizing, we are unwilling
to read the construction-industry proviso as broadly as Local 100 suggests. Instead, we
think its authorization extends only to agreements in the context of collectivebargaining relationships and in light of congressional references to the Denver Building Trades problem, possibly to common-situs relationships on particular jobsites as
well.
id. at 633.
55. Id. at 633-34.
56. Id. at 634.
57.
58.

Id. at 640-46.
Id. at 647.
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abuses of union power were discussed and rejected.5 9 Stewart argued,
nevertheless, that either the agreement at bar was within the construction

industry proviso to §8(e), thus lawful and not subject to antitrust
actions,60 or that the agreement violated §8(e) but was not subject to
antitrust scrutiny because the labor law remedies were exclusive.
II
, At three points in the Connell decision, the Supreme CoUrt noted
PART

iat it was not dealing with an agreement negotiated in the context of a
c6llective bargaining relationship. 6' A question remained as to the effect
that a collective bargaining relationship would have on the validity of a

restrictive subcontracting agreement. On February 8, 1978, the National

Labor Relations Board heard an unprecedented six hours of argument6 2
on four cases 63 which raised that and other related questions. This
section of the paper will focus on the position taken by the Board and
the Circuit Courts 64 on the impact of a collective bargaining relationship
on the validity of a restrictive subcontracting clause.
The Board Decision
The Board's view of the effect of a collective bargaining relationship

on the validity of a restrictive subcontracting clause was stated in its

decision in CarpentersLocals 944 and235, United Brotherhoodof Carpenters (Woelke & Romero Framing,Inc.). 65
Since 1974, Woelke and Local 944 had been parties to an executed

memorandum collective bargaining agreement. This agreement, in turn,

bound Woelke to the terms of the 1974-77 Master Labor Agreement of

59.
60.
61.

Id. at 650-53.
Id. at 648 n.8.
Id. at 625-26, 633, 635.

62.

LAB. REL. REP. YEARBOOK (BNA) (1978).

63. Local 944, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO,
and Local No. 235, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO
(Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc.), 239 NLRB 241,99 L.R.R.M. 1580 (1978); Colorado Building and Construction Trades Council (Utilities Services Engineering, Inc.), 239 NLRB 253, 99
L.R.R.M. 1601 (1978). Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, and Local
Union No. 1497, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (Donald Schriver,
Inc.), 239 NLRB 264, 99 L.R.R.M. 1593 (1978); and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 701, AFL-CIO, and Oregon-Columbia Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America (Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc.), 239
NLRB 274,99 L.R.R.M. 1589 (1978).
64. Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB,
609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979), reh'g. en banc, 654 F.2d 1301 (1981) and Donald Schriver. Inc. v.
NLRB, 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
65. 239 NLRB 241, 99 L.R.R.M. 1580 (1978).
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the Carpenters Union. 66 As the terms of the Master Labor Agreement
were about to expire, the parties met to negotiate a successor agreement.
These negotiations broke down when the parties reached impasse over,
inter alia,67 the issue of the inclusion of a restrictive subcontracting
clause.6 8 Respondent unions, thereafter, picketed at various job sites
66. Id. 239 NLRB at 242-43, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1581-82. Through this agreement, WVoelke
was contractually related to Local 235 as well.
67. Impasse was also reached over the inclusion of a foreman within the bargaining unit.
Id. at 243, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1582. Charges stemming from the Union's demand for inclusion of
foremen were also filed and determined by the Board in the instant decision. Id. at 241, 99
L.R.R.M. at 1580.
68. Id. at 243, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1582. The subcontracting provisions demanded by Local
944 are set forth below:
103. The purposes of this paragraph 103 are to preserve and protect the work
opportunities normally available to employees and workmen covered by this Agreement, maintenance and protection of standards and benefits of employees and workmen negotiated over many years, and preservation of the right of union employees,
employed hereunder, from being compelled to work with non-union workmen.
103.1 In the event that enforcement of paragraph 103.2 is restrained by issuance
of an injunction by a United States District Court upon the petition of a Regional
Direction [sic] of the National Labor Relations Board, or otherwise, such provision
shall be suspended pending its final adjudication, and the provisions set forth in
paragraph 103.3 shall be applicable pending final adjudication thereof.
103.1.1 Definition of Subcontractor. A subcontractor is defined as any person
(other than an employee covered by this Agreement), firm or corporation holding a
valid state contractor's license where required by law who agrees orally or in writing to
perform, or who in fact performs for or on behalf of an individual Contractor, or the
subcontractor of an individual Contractor, any part or portion of the work covered by
this Agreement.
103.2 The Contractor agrees that neither he nor any of his subcontractors on
thejobsite will subcontract any work to be done at the site of construction, alteration,
painting or repair of a building structure or other work (including quarries, rock,
sand, and gravel plants, asphalt plants, ready-mix concrete plants, established on or
adjacent to the jobsite to process or supply materials for the convenience of the
Contractor for jobsite use) except to a person, firm or corporation, party to an
appropriate, current labor agreement with the appropriate Union, or subordinate
body signatory to this Agreement.
103.3 Because of the close relationship between individual contractors and subcontractors at the jobsite and the close community of interests of the employees on the
jobsite with respect to on-site work covered by this Agreement, that is, work done at
the site of construction, alteration, painting or repair of a building, structure or other
work (including quarries, rock, sand and gravel plants, asphalt plants, ready-mix
concrete or batch plants, established on or adjacent to thejobsite to process or supply
materials for the convenience of the Contractor for jobsite use), herein called "jobsite
work," and because of the Union's concern that subcontractors who are not subject to
the same total labor costs as those who are party hereto will deprive Union members
employed hereunder of work opportunities because of lower labor costs, it is agreed as
follows:
103.3.1 The Contractor and his subcontractors shall not subcontract any jobsite
work, except to a contractor whose employees on that job are members of a bona-fide
labor organization, and whose labor costs on such job, at all times during the term of
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where Woelke had contracted to do work. 69 Woelke then sought a complaint from the General Counsel charging the unions with violating

§8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(A) by picketing to force it to enter into an agreement

prohibited by §8(e). 70

The General Counsel issued a complaint and took the position that
the subcontracting clause in question was secondary and, therefore, pre-

sumptively within the proscription of §8(e), and that it was not, under
Connell, sheltered by the construction industry proviso. 71 The unions
first contended that the subcontracting clause was primary, since it was

designed to preserve traditional unit work and to maintain economic
standards. In the alternative, they asserted that even if the agreement was

secondary, it was protected by the construction industry proviso to §8(e).
The unions further argued that Connellwas distinguishable in that they

had a collective bargaining relationship with petitioner.72

The Board first determined that the subcontracting agreement was
secondary. The Board relied upon National Woodwork Manufacturers
Ass'n. v. NLRB 73 and California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n.,74 and
his subcontract hereunder are not less than those of contractors performing similar
work to that covered by this Agreement, including, but not limited to, costs of subsistence, vacation, holiday, medical, hospitalization, wages, premiums, dental, life insurance and retirement benefits as provided by this Agreement.
103.3.2 The Contractor.shall require each such subcontractor to weekly supply
to the Contractor, who will then upon request make available to the Union a copy of
the subcontractor's certified labor costs for such job, and to submit to an audit of
those labor costs by a certified public accountant upon request of the Union to
confirm compliance with 103.3.1
103.3.3 Failure to comply with the foregoing subparagraph 103.3.1 and 103.3.2
shall entitle the Union, notwithstanding Article V, to seek judicial relief, upon written
notice to the Contractor and the subcontractor, to compel the suspension of such
subcontractor's work until there has been compliance, together with attorney's fees for
the bringing of such action. In any such court proceeding, the court shall, if it is
thereafter in dispute, determine whether there has been compliance.
103.5 All work performed by the Contractors or subcontractors and all services
rendered for the Contractors or subcontractors, as herein defined, shall be rendered in
accordance with each and all of the terms and provisions hereof.
103.6 If the Contractor or subcontractors shall subcontract jobsite work
covered under the jurisdiction of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, including the furnishing and installation of material, performance of labor,
and the operation of equipment, provision shall be made in written contract for the
observance and compliance by his subcontractors with the full terms of this
Agreement.
69. Id. at 242-43, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1581-82.
70. 29 U.S.C. §158 (1976).
71. 239 NLRB at 244, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1583.
72. Id. at 244-45, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1583.
73. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
74. Heavy, Highway, Building and Construction Teamsters Committee for Northern
California, et al. (California Dump Truck Owners Association), 227 NLRB 269, 94 L.R.R.M.
1210 (1976) (former-Member Fanning and Member Jenkins dissenting in part).
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distinguished between those agreements designed to preserve traditional
work or to maintain economic standards (primary), and those which
merely sought to acquire work not traditionally done by the unions, or
which would limit subcontracting to employers who were signatories to
a union agreement (secondary). 75 Here, the Board determined that the
agreement was secondary, on the grounds that it allowed the subcontracting of unit work and, therefore, was not designed to protect traditional work. Further, the Board reasoned that the subcontracting clause
did not limit subcontracting just to employers paying the same wages. Its
requirement that subcontractors be party to "this Agreement" rendered
76
it a classic union signatory clause.
The Board, once it concluded that the subcontracting provision was
secondary, had to determine whether the construction industry proviso
to §8(e) sheltered the provision. The Board needed to examine the scope
of the Supreme Court's decision in Connell. The General Counsel and
petitioner contended that the existence of a valid collective bargaining
relationship was only the beginning of an inquiry as to whether or not a
broad restrictive subcontracting clause was validated by the construction
industry proviso to §8(e). 77 Specifically, they argued that the clauses here
were overly broad in two respects; they operated whether or not Woelke
had craft employees working, and they required allegiance to a particular labor organization. The unions, on the other hand, contended that
the absence of a collective bargaining relationship was the critical factor
which resulted in the subcontracting clause in Connell being found out78
side of the protection of the proviso to §8(e).
The Board held that the existence of the collective bargaining relationship between Woelke and the unions was dispositive. It viewed the
issue in Connell as being "whether the existence of a collective-bargaining relationship constituted a prerequisite to ... the applicability of the
construction industry proviso .... ,"79 The Board found the whole Con75. 239 NLRB at 245-46, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1584.
76. Id. at 246-47,99 L.R.R.M. at 1585. The Board also construed a second subcontracting
provision which was designed to be in effect should the first one be declared illegal. Once again,
the Board found this provision to be beyond the permissible bounds of a lawful area standards
provision, because it required union membership, not just union wages.
77. Id. at 248, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1586. The General Counsel and Woelke argued that a
subcontracting agreement would not be sheltered by §8(e) unless:
(1) a valid collective-bargaining relationship exists between the labor organization and the employer, (2) the contractual clause is operational only at times when the
employer has employees represented by the labor organization, (3) the clause applies
only to sites at which the employer has employees represented by the labor organization, and (4) the clause does not require that the employer have collective-bargaining
relationships with particular unions.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 249, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1587.
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nell decision to be "cast in terms of the impact of the absence of a
collective bargaining relationship" 80 with the "heart" of the decision
being the Connell majority's concluding statement:
[W]e are unwilling to read the construction industry proviso as broadly as Local 100 suggests. Instead, we think its authorization extends
only to agreements in the context of collective-bargaining relationships and, in light of congressional references to the Denver Building
Trades problem, possibly to common-situs relationships on particular jobsites as well. 8'
Pacific Northwest v. NLRB
Review of the Board's decision in Woelke & RoMero was sought in
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. Initially, in PacificNorthwest Chapter
of the Associated Builders & Contractors,Inc. v. NLRB,82 a divided
Court disagreed with the Board and found that the existence of a collective bargaining relationship was not sufficient to distinguish Connell.
Judge Sneed, writing for the Court found the Board's decision to be
at odds with Connell.The court held that a collective bargaining relationship was necessary but not sufficient for the validation of a restrictive
subcontracting clause. In addition to the collective bargaining relationship, Judge Sneed found that the proviso would shelter subcontracting
clauses only when "the employer or his subcontractor has employees
who are members of the signatory union at work at some time at the
jobsite at which the employer wishes to engage a nonunion subcontractor. '3
Judge Sneed, conceding that Connell was "not unambiguous," 8 4
argued that §8(e) must be construed to be consistent with its primary
legislative purpose, He read Connellas determining the legislative intent
to be to limit top-down organizing85 and to strengthen prohibitions
against secondary economic pressure. 86
The union argued that the intent of the proviso to §8(e) was to
preserve pre-1959 construction industry law and that subcontracting
clauses were lawful pre-1959. Judge Sneed responded, however, that the
status of such clauses was not clear.87 Moreover, he noted that Congres80.

Id. at 250, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1587-88.
81. Id. citing 421 U.S. at 633.
82. 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
83. Id. at 1347.
84. Id. at 1348.
85. Id. at 1347.
86. Id. at 1348.
87. Local 1976, United Brotherhbod of Carpenlers v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93
(1958) was distinguished in two ways. First, Sand Doorinvolved a contractual provision prohibiting nonunion goods, rather than a ban on nonunion labor subcontracting. Second, Sand
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sional statements about §8(e) that indicated that no change in the law
was intended were belied by changes that §8(e) expressly made in the
law.88
According to Judge Sneed, the main purpose of the proviso was to
prevent the potential jobsite friction problem that existed when union
and nonunion workers were at the same project. 89 The contract clauses
in question were, therefore, broader than needed to serve the proviso's
purpose since they limited subcontracting even where there was no possibility of union and nonunion workers being at the same site. 90
A hearing en bane was granted by the 9th Circuit and the decision
of the original panel was reversed. 9' A majority of seven Judges found
that subcontracting clauses negotiated in the context of collective bargaining relationships were sheltered by the construction industry proviso
93
to §8(e). 92 Two dissenting opinions were issued.
On the issue of whether the subcontracting clauses were within the
construction industry proviso to §8(e), Judge Canby, writing for the
majority, reviewed the history of the construction industry's treatment
under the NLRA prior to the adoption of §8(e) in order to interpret the
legislative intent behind the construction industry proviso to §8(e). He
observed that unique industry characteristics (occasional, short-term
employment relationships, the contractor's need to set wages in binding
agreements before workers were hired) made it difficult to fit the indus94
try within a statute designed to deal with the industrial plant paradigm.
These unique characteristics led to an initial decision by the NLRB to
Door directly involved the legality of coerced enforcement of the contractual provision and the
Supreme Court expressly declined to decide the validity of the hot cargo agreement itself. Id. "t
1348-49.
88. Judge Sneed cited two examples: The proviso to §8(e) expressly limits its protection
to jobsite work. No such limit was mentioned in Sand Door. Further, the proviso does not
protect agreements relating to materials and the agreement at issue in Sand Door was an
agreement prohibiting a certain kind of material, i.e., a door. Id. at 1349.
89. This is the Denver Building Trades problem. Since, under Denver, a union could not
picket to force a nonunion contractor off ajobsite, the potential for conflict existed. Id.
90. One could even go one step farther and suggest that subcontracting could create
friction. Suppose Able Contracting Corp., a general contractor, only had a union agreement
with the Carpenters and the agreement's subcontracting clause was only applicable to carpentry
work. If Able used nonunion subcontractors for all other specialty work, the subcontracting
clause would itself introduce a jobsite friction problem.
91. 654 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981).
92. The majority opinion of Judge Canby was supported by Browning, C.J., Wallace,
Schroeder, Fletcher, Nelson and Norris.
93. Judge Sneed wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by Judges Choy, Anderson
and Farris. 654 F.24, t 1324. Judge Farris wrote another dissenting opinion which was joined by
Judges Choy and Anderson. Id. at 1327.
94. Id. at 1309-10. For a more extensive treatment of the industry characteristics and
their impact on cori truction industry labor relations, see Stiglitz, supra, n.8.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

15

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Forum

[Vol. 1: 2

decline to exercise jurisdiction over the industry.95 After the Taft-Hartley
Amendments to the Act, 96 the Board decided to apply the Act to the
construction industry.97 This created some problems.
As previously noted, 98 in NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction
Trades Council,99 the secondary boycott restrictions, as applied to the
construction industry, prevented a union from picketing a general con-

tractor, with whom it had a collective bargaining relationship, to force it
to get rid of a nonunion subcontractor. Another problem involved the
illegality of prehire agreements.

Thus, Judge Canby found that the legislative agenda for the 1959
amendments to the Act included the accommodation of the Act to the
needs of the construction industry. A separate item on the agenda
included a desire to limit hot cargo agreements which were tacitly (albeit

not specifically) approved by the Supreme Court in Local 1976, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door).oo The LandrumGriffin Amendments to the Act' 01 embodied changes that dealt with
both of those items.
After noting that section 8(e) was designed to "narrow or close" the
loophole for hot cargo agreements 02 and that the construction industry
proviso was a compromise, 03 Judge Canby found that the intent of the
95. Id. at 1309, citing Brown and Root, Inc., 51 NLRB 820, 12 L.R.R.M. 278 (1943), and
Johns-Manville Corp. 61 NLRB 1, 16 L.R.R.M. 77 (1945).
96. Offcially, the Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) amended by 73
Stat. 519 (1959), [codified at 29 U.S.C. §§141-97 (1976)].
97. Several provisions in Taft-Hartley made it clear that Congress intended to regulate the
construction industry, but as Judge Canby noted, Taft-Hartley was not immediately enforced
against the industry. 654 F.2d at 1310. For general background on the changes in the application
of the NLRA to the construction industry brought about by Taft-Hartley, see Comment, The

Impact of the Taft-Hartley on the Building and Construction Industry, 60 YALE L.J. 673 (1951);
Sherman, Legal Status of the Building and Construction 7kades Unions in the Hiring Process,
47 GEO. L.J. 203 (1958); Fenton, Union Hiring Halls Under the Taft Hartley Act, 9 LAn. L.J.
505 (1958).
98. See supra note 47.
99. 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
100. 654 F.2d at 1310.
101. Officially, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat.
519 (1959), codified in 29 U.S.C. §§401-531 (1976), amending NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§153, 158,
159, 160, 164, 186, 187 (1976).
102. 654 F.2d at 1311.
103. As was noted in Connell,see supra note 45 and accompanying text, the Senate bill
would have prohibited hot-cargo agreements only in the trucking industry. S. 1555, reprintedin
1 NLRB Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting And Disclosure Act of 1959
516, 582 (hereinafter cited as I or 2 NLRB Leg. Hist.). The House bill would have outlawed all
hot cargo agreements. H.R. 8342, as amended by H.R. 8400, reprintedin I NLRB Leg. Hist.
619, 683. The Conference Committee chose the House bill with an exception for the construction industry. H.R. Rep. No. 1147, (Conference Report), reprintedin 1959 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2503, 2510-12 and in I NLRB Leg. Hist. 934, 942-44.
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construction industry proviso was to preserve the pattern of collective
bargaining in the industry. In support, he quoted the Conference Committee report:
The committee of conference does not intend that this proviso
should be construed so as to change the present state of the law with
respect to the validity of this specific type of agreement relating to
work to be done at the site of the construction project or to remove
the limitations which the present law imposes with respect to such
agreements .... To the extent that such agreements are legal today
under section 8(b)(4) .. ., the proviso would prevent such legality

from being affected by section 8(e).1 4

In addition he cited an analysis by Senator Kennedy, who was Chairman
of the Senate Conferees:
The first proviso under new §8(e) of the National Labor Relations
Act is intended to preserve the present state of the law with respect to
picketing at the site of a construction project and with respect to the
validity of agreements relating to the contracting of work to be done

at the site of a construction project.
Agreements by which a contractor in the construction industry
promises not to subcontract work on a construction site to a nonunion contractorappearto be legal today. They will not be unlawful
under §8(e) . . 10 (Italics by the Court).

Judge Canby then found that the "present law" referred to by the Committee did not restrict subcontracting agreements to jobsites where there
106
were union members present.
The next issue faced by Judge Canby was whether Connellchanged
this situation. 0 7 While recognizing the Connellmajority's problem with
104. 654 F.2d at 1312, citing I NLRB Leg. Hist. 943.
105. Id., citing 2 NLRB Leg. Hist. 1433.
106. Id. at 1313. In support, he cited Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 v. NLRB,
266 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. deniedsub nom, St. Maurice v. NLRB, 361 U.S. 834 (1959),
which upheld a subcontracting agreement as broad as the ones sought by the unions here. Judge
Canby noted that the decision in St. Maurice and the problem of union signatory clauses was
brought to the attention of the House and Senate in 1959. He also cited to a study of subcontracting clauses done in 1961 which confirmed the existence of broad subcontracting agreements
before 1959, 654 F.2d at 1313-14, citing, Lunden, SubcontractingClauses in Major Contracts
Part I, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 579 (1961). Judge Canby indicated that the Lunden report failed to
adequately distinguish between union signatory and union standards clauses. He also cited a
Memorandum of the General Counsel finding the Lunden study to be inconclusive and stating
that no "pattern" existed. (General Counsel Memorandum 76-57, located at LAB. REL. YEARnOOK (BNA) at 295 (1976). But Judge Canby concluded that broad subcontracting clauses i.e.,
those not restricted to a particular site, did exist [emphasis added] pre-1959, were legal, and that
Congress did not intend to change that situation. Id. at 1313-14, see esp. n.23.
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top-down organizing, Judge Canby found Connellto be distinguishable
because it arose outside of the context of a collective bargaining
108
relationship.
Judge Canby started with the proposition that because of the transitory nature of construction industry employment relationships, unions
(and employees) have a difficult time maintaining wage standards and
pension benefits. 09 Therefore, subcontracting clauses negotiated in the
context of a collective bargaining relationship are, to the extent that they
seek to protect employees whose work is to be contracted away, primary
in nature, (even though they may be legally secondary because of other
potential consequences). It was the legitimacy of interests created by the
collective bargaining relationship that made its existence significant. 110
Judge Canby then discussed the jobsite restrictions which the appellants read as limiting the effect of the proviso to potential jobsite friction
problems. The restriction is appropriate on the grounds that it is at the
jobsite where the special industry characteristics are manifested."'1 But,
according to Judge Canby, the Connell Court's references to the legislative history of §8(e) suggest that its concern went beyond the shoulderto-shoulder friction problem that can exist at a jobsite. Rather, the
problem suggested is that the union is precluded from picketing the
general contractor to protest against a nonunion subcontractor when, in
reality, "a general contractor is, in effect, entirely in control of the kind
of labor relations taking place on the site he runs."" 12
Judge Canby conceded that the Connell Court was concerned with
the top-down organizing effect of subcontracting clauses but he argued
that some top-down effect is contained in any subcontracting clause
(even a subcontracting clause the appellants would concede as being
107.

As Judge Canby stated:
But for the Connell decision, we would have no difficulty in enforcing the Board's
order. Prior to Connell, this court, other circuits and the Board had upheld broad
subcontracting clauses in collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Construction,
Production& Maintenance Laborers Union, Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 E2d 422 (9th
Cir. 1963); Suburban Title Center Inc., v. Rockford Building & Constructon Trades
Council, 354 F.2d 1, 2-3 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960, 86 S.Ct. 1585, 16
L.Ed. 2d 673 (1966); United Associaton ofJourneymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry Local 48, 190 N.L.R.B. 415,416-17(1971).
Id. at 1315 n.25.
108. Because Connell arose outside of the collective bargaining context, Judge Conby
stated: "The holding of Connell, then, does not in the strict sense control the cases before us."
Id. at 1316.
109. Id.
110. Id.at 1317.
111.

Id.

112. Id. at 1319 quotinga statement by Senator Morse (2 NLRB Leg. Hist. 1425), cited in
Connell, 421 U.S. at 629-30 n.9.
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authorized). Further, the proviso itself was designed as an exception to
the general thrust of §8(e).1 3 Moreover, the Connell Court was faced
with the prospect of "unlimited" coercive picketing since §8(b)(7) limits
would not come into play where the union expressly disclaimed any
representational interest." 4 Where a collective bargaining relationship
was sought, an employer could invoke §8(b)(7) to restrict picketing. If a
collective bargaining relationship already existed, the employer could
resist the subcontracting clause "by asserting its own bargaining position
and presenting its own demands."" 5 Thus, the top-down organizing
potential was subject to limits.
Judge Canby noted ihat appellants' suggestion, that subcontracting
agreements be limited to sites Where the employer had union workers,
would create practical problems. Either the unions would have to negotiate on a site by site basis, or police a broad agreement on a site by site
basis to ensure compliance. 116
Appellants also attacked the subcontracting clause's validity because it required allegiance to a particular union. Judge Canby found
nothing in the proviso to §8(e) to suggest a limit to its effect where a
"particular union" subcontracting clause was s6ught. 1 7 In fact, he
argued that such clauses were necessary for unions in order to "protec[t]
the wages and benefits of its [union] members in the primary unit who
l8
may later work for subcontractors.""
Judge Sneed dissented in an opinion which reiterated the views he
expressed in the original panel's decision. He focused his analysis on
Connell as the proper starting point and argued that the en banc panel's
decision is "not empathetic with Connell's concern with the "top-down"
organizing effect of union signatory clauses."" 9
As for the legislative history, Judge Sneed found it to be inconclusive, but supportive of the proposition that "most congressmen thought
113. Id. at 1320.
114. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
115. Id. at 1321.
116. Id.at 1321-22.
117. In fact, he again cited Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 v. NLRB, 266 F.2d
905 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. deniedsub nom, as a pre-59 case, known to Congress, which allowed
a particular union subcontracting clause. Id. at 1323. In addition, a similar result was reached
by the D.C. Circuit in Donald Schriver Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 859 (1980).
118. 654 F.2d at 1323.
119. Id. at 1325. Judge Sneed made the argument that the original panel's decision would
have allowed a contractor to opt for efficiency and economy in more situations, i.e., if one could
only choose union firms, the possibility of using a more efficient nonunion firm is precluded,
even where such a nonunion firm pays union wages. Id. at 1325-26. Judge Sneed is doubtless
correct that such an interpretation is true to Connell's concern about only restricting wage based
as opposed to efficiency based competition. 421 U.S. at 623. But Connell was an antitrust case
and here the issue is presented in a purely labor relations context.
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the proviso was intended to address the problem of jobsite friction."120
Finally, he argued that no real practical problems were raised by the
original panel's interpretation of the legitimate scope of subcontracting
clauses. Unions would need to police any collective bargaining agreement on a site by site basis, so having clauses triggered by whether the
employer had unit employees on the site would add no burden.' 2'
The dissenting opinion of Judge Farris acknowledged that Congress may have had other problems than jobsite friction in mind when it
drafted the proviso to §8(e), but he disagreed with the majority's argument that another purpose of the proviso was the maintenance of contract standards in the industry. These standards, he argued, can be maintained by union standards clauses which are primary and, therefore,
don't need the proviso. 2 2 The collective bargaining relationship noted in
Connellcan only legitimize a restraint that serves the interest of "workers
represented by the union in the course of their employment by the
employer."12 3
Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB
Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 124 was an appeal of one of the
companion cases to Woelke & Romero. As in Pacific Northwest, the
court was required to construe the construction industry proviso to
§8(e). As to the proper interpretation of the construction industry proviso to §8(e), the court in Schriver basically agreed with the en banc
decision in PacificNorthwest.2 5 Judge Edwards, writing for the majority
of the court, examined the "statutory setting and circumstances surrounding [§8(e)'s] enactment," and noted that §8(e) did not limit the
court, and that Connell did not specifically decide the issues before the
court. 126

He observed that §8(e) was enacted to close the loophole in the Act
illuminated by Sand Door but that the proviso to §8(e) was included,
according to Senator Kennedy, "to avoid serious damage to the pattern

120. Id. at 1326.
121. Id. at 1327.
122. Id. at 1328. This does not, however, deal with the problem of pension benefits.
Union standards clauses do not allow workers to continue to accrue pension fund contributions
and credit.
123. Id. Unfortunately, Judge Farris didn't give any illustration of non-primary restraints
that are validated by collective bargaining agreements. Thus, the hope he holds seems illusory.
124. 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
125. Technically, one would have to say that the en banc decision was in accordance with
the Schriverdecision since Schriver was decided before the en banc court rendered its decision.
126. 635 F.2d at 877, quoting Connell, 421 U.S. at 628.
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of collective bargaining" in the construction industry. 127 He then found
128
that this pre-59 pattern included agreements such as those at issue.
Judge Edward's decision precisely clarified why jobsite limitations
would be inappropriate. Subcontracting is the norm in construction and
unions do not desire to eliminate the practice. A union worker is not
committed to a particular employer or project and does not care about
working on a particular job or for a particular employer. But the worker
does need to ensure that any work is maintained for the employment
pool in which he operates and that any work he receives gives him the
same benefits. This includes pension benefits. If the subcontractor agreement can be avoided by not having any union workers (the jobsite limit
that employers argued for), the purpose of the subcontracting agreement
129
would be "subverted," i.e., the work would not go to his labor pool.
Finally, Judge Edwards distinguished Connell by concluding that
the union there sought an agreement of a type not part of the pre-59
bargaining pattern. 130 (In Connell the union only sought a bare union
only subcontracting agreement rather than a subcontracting provision in
a broader labor agreement). The unique tactic was also immune to some
of the limits on coercive union activity contained in §§8(b)(4) and
8(b)(7). Thus, sanctioning the agreement in Connell would have allowed
3
a union to exert "unlimited" top-down pressure.' 1
The question of whether "specific union" subcontracting clauses
were illegal also was raised and the Court held that they were not. Again,
Judge Edwards determined no such limitation in the language of §8(e).
He found that specific union clauses were included in pre-59 construction labor agreements and noted that such agreements had been
132
upheld by the Board.
127. Id. at 878, quoting2 NLRB Leg. Hist. 1432.
128. Id. at 879. Judge Edwards placed heavy reliance on the Lunden Report (see supra
Lunden note 106). This report supports his conclusion in two ways; it demonstrates that the
kind of agreement in question existed pre-59 and was, therefore, part of the pattern, and it also
notes that no agreements contained the kind of limits that employers argue are required.
Lunden, Subcontracting Clauses in Major Contracts, Part II, 84 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 715
(1961).
129. 635 F2d at 881.
130. Id. at 882. Judge Edwards found support for this proposition in the dissenting
opinion to the 5th Circuit's decision in Connell:
Judge Clark noted that the union in Connell had been unable, in response to a specific
request for supplemental briefs, "to point out any source of information which would
show that subcontractor contracts such as the one in this case were even occasionally
utilized in the industry prior to 1959, much less so common a practice that we could
assume Congress intended to preserve that part of the pattern of collective bargaining
in the industry." 483 F.2d at 1182.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 884. Moreover, a union's need to maintain pension benefits is not aided by a
clause that is not union specific. Id. at 885-86.
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Woelke & Romero Framing,Inc. v. NLRB
In Woelke & Romero, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
the holding of the 9th Circuit that "subcontracting clauses sought or
negotiated in the cotext of a collective bargaining relationship are protected by the construction ifidustry proviso even when not limited in
application to particular jobsites at which both union and nonunion
workers are employed."' 133 Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for a unahimous teourt, started with the proposition that the subcontracting clauses
at issue ieeded the shelter of the proviso since they fell within the terms
of the general prohibition of §8(e).134 While a literal interpfetation of the
proviso would sanction these agreements, Connellrequired that §8(e) be
"interpreted in light of the statutory setting and circumstances surrounding its enactment."' 3 5 According to Marshall, the legislative history of
§8(e) "clearly" evidences a Congressional intent to protect subcontracting clauses like those in question in the case at bar. 36
Because Sand Door "indicated3' that voluntary compliance with hot
cargo agreements was permissible, a gap existed before 1959 in the Act's
secondary boycott provisions. 37 Section 8(e), designed to eliminate that
gap, was the product of legislative compromise 138 and included the proviso for the construction industry at the insistence of the Senate Conferees. 139 The Conference Committee report stated that it did not want to
change the law with regard to the legality of agreements regarding site
work. 140 Moreover, remarks in the legislative history by then Senator
Kennedy, chairman of the Senate Conferees, indicate a desire to preserve

133. 456 U.S. 645, 648 (1982).
134. Presumably then, the Court agreed that the clauses were "secondary." See supra
notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
135. 456 U.S. at 653.
136. Id. at 654.
137. Id. at 655. Thus, petitioners' argument that Sand Doorexpressly avoided deciding
whether hot cargo agreements were legal is irrelevant. See supra note 87 and accompanying
text.
038. The Senate bill would have outlawed hot cargo agreements only in the trucking
industry. 105 Conig. Rec. 6556 (1959), 2 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Leg. Hist.) 1161-62. The legislation proposed by the
House-the Landrum-Griffin Bill-was much broader. It made it an unfair labor practice for
any labor organization and any employer to enter into an agreement whereby the employer
agrees to "cease doing business with any other person." H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
§705(b)(1) (1959), 1 Leg. Hist. 683.
Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 655-56, quoting from I NLRB Leg. Hist. 943.
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the status quo.141 According to Marshall, the remarks of Senator
Kennedy were entitled to "substantial weight" since the Senate Conferees
were the ones who "insisted" on the proviso.1 42 The question thus
became, what did Congress perceive to be the status quo, viz., subcon43
tracting clauses.
Marshall found "ample evidence" that Congress believed that
"union signatory" clauses were "part of the pattern of collective bargain-

ing in the construction industry ."144 Senator Kennedy is again quoted,

45

and testimony of Senator Curtis, an opponent of the use of subcontracting clauses, is characterized as finding extensive legal use of broad sub46
contracting agreements. 1

Marshall also concluded that this perception of the status of subcon-

tracting clauses was correct. First, broad subcontracting clauses had
been approved by the Board and the D.C. Circuit.1 47 Moreover, petition-

141. For the first statement cited by Justice Marshall, see supra note 105 and first paragraph of accompanying text. Marshall also quoted the following statement:
The Landrum-Griffin bill extended the 'hot cargo' provisions of the Senate bill,
which we applied only to Teamsters, to all agreements between an employer and a
labor union by which the employer agrees not to do business with another concern.
The Senate insisted upon a qualification for the clothing and apparel industries and
for agreements relating to work to be done at the site of a construction project. Both
changes were necessary to avoid serious damage to thepattern of collective bargaining
in those industries. 105 Cong. Rec. 17889 (1959), 2 Leg. Hist. 1432.
Id. at 656.
142. Id. n.9. Marshall also cited other legislators who made similar remarks, see e.g., Rep.
Barden: "This proviso is intended to permit what is now lawful." (2 NLRB Leg. Hist. 1715);
"Both changes (the clothing and construction industry provisos to Landrum-Griffin [the House
bill]) were necessary to avoid serious damage to the pattern of collective bargaining in these
industries." (2 NLRB Leg. Hist. 1721).
143. Petitioners argued that Congress was wrong about the pre-59 status quo. The court
responded by saying:
[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether Congress correctly perceived the then state of the
law, but rather what its perception of the state of the law was." Brown v. GSA, 425
U.S. 820, 828, (1976). In any event, Congress' belief that subcontracting agreements
were common and lawful was accurate.
Id. at 658.
144. Id. at 657.
145. Agreements by which a contractor in the construction industry promises not to
subcontract work on a construction site to a nonunion contractor appear to be legal today.
They will not be unlawful under section 8(e). The proviso is also applicable to all other agreements involving undertakings not to do work on a construction project site with other contractors or subcontractors regardless of the precise relation between them. 105 Cong. Rec. 17900
(1959), 2 Leg. Hist. 1483.
Id.
146. Id. at 657-58.
147. The Court cited Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. (St. Maurice,
Helmkamp & Musser), 119 NLRB 1026, 41 L.R.R.M.1209 (1957), review denied and enforced
sub. nom., Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
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ers were unable to find and to cite any pre-1959 case in which a subcontracting clause was found unlawful because it was not limited to sites
where the relevant union members were working. 48
Marshall further relied on findings contained in a report written in
1961 by Leon C. Lunden entitled Subcontracting Clauses in Major
Contracts.149 Marshall stated:
The most frequent requirement, found in more than 50 major contracts, obligated contractors to subcontract work only to subcontractors who would apply all the "terms and conditions" of the master agreement. Id. at 715-716. The Lunden report does not describe a
single agreement that limited the applicability of a subcontracting
restriction to job sites at which both union and nonunion workers
50
were employed.
Though the Lunden Report itself did not distinguish clearly between
union signatory and union standards clauses, Marshall uncovered other
evidence that demonstrated that union signatory clauses such as those
under review were contained in 12% of the contracts studied.' 5'
Marshall's opinion then focused on two arguments made by petitioners. The first argument was that the proviso was designed as an
attempt to partially overrule Denver Building Trades and that the problem with the decision in Denver is that it might lead to "uneasy
employee relationships on the jobsite." 52 Thus, argued the petitioners,
the subcontracting clauses should be limited by interpreting the proviso
to achieve that effect.
Marshall responded by saying that the Denver problem was
broader than possible jobsite friction:
Critics of Denver Building Trades complained that contractors and
subcontractors working together on a single construction project
are not the sort of neutral parties that the secondary boycott provisions were designed to protect. They pointed out that the Denver
Building Trades rule denied construction workers the right to
engage in economic picketing at their place of employment. And
denied, 361 U.S. 834, and noted that the decision of the D.C. Circuit was introduced at House
Labor hearings, thus buttressing the argument that Congress perceived these clauses to be legal
pre-59. Id. at 658-59.
148. Id.
149. 84 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 579 (1961).

150. 456 U.S. at 659 (footnote omitted).
151. Id. at n.12 citing General Counsel's Memorandum, December 15, 1976 LAB. REL.
YEARBOOK (BNA) at 295, 309 (1976). The Court also cited Pierson, Building-Rades Bargaining
Planin Southern California,70 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 14, 17 and found similar clauses as part of
the bargaining pattern in Southern California, where Woelke & Romero arose.
152. Id. at 661.
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they emphasized that the employees of various subcontractors have
a close community of interest, and that the wages and working
conditions of one set of employees may affect others. In fact, as the
Court of Appeals noted, the problem of jobsite friction between
union and nonunion workers received relatively little emphasis. See
654 F2d, at 1319.153
The proviso served these purposes by authorizing agreements
which, if adhered to, would prevent nonunion workers from being on
the site. Marshall similarly rejected petitioners' argument because the
proviso was also designed to serve purposes other than to alleviate the
54
Denver problem.1
The second argument made by petitioners involved the effect that
allowing these clauses would have, i.e., that the unions would have a
powerful top-down organizing tool which the 1959 amendments to the
Act were designed to eliminate or, at least, curtail. 155 Marshall responded by stating that top-down pressure is implicit in the proviso
itself, which was part of the 1959 package. Therefore, the question was
how much pressure did Congress intend to tolerate. The answer to the
question that Marshall gave was: "whatever top-down pressure such
56
clauses might entail.'
Marshall noted that the effect of these clauses is limited by
§8(b)(7), which restricts picketing without regard to the wishes of the
employees involved, 157 and by §8(f) which would allow contractors to
enter into voidable or temporary agreements. 58 Nonunion employees
would not be "frozen out of the job market" by subcontracting agreements even when the agreements had hiring hall provisions. Union
hiring halls are required to refer nonunion members, and even if union
membership is required under a union security clause, the obligations of
membership would be limited to the normal union financial obligations. 5 9 Finally, Denver still prevented secondary picketing, and it was
153. Id. at 661-62.
154. Id. at 662. Unfortunately the page reference to these other purposes (654-61) does
not coincide to any discussion of the reasons for §8(e) and the proviso. Presumably, these
numbers are incorrect and the Court intended to refer to the discussion of the intent of the
proviso to preserve the pre-59 status quo.
155. Id. at 662-63.
156. Id. at 663.
157. Id. Thus the unions here will not have the unlimited weapon that the union in
Connell potentially had. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
158. Id. at 664. The argument here is that a traditionally nonunion subcontractor could
bid on a union job, execute a §8(f) union agreement, and walk away from the agreement after
the job was through.
159. Id. at 664-65. The Court's language here is equivocal. It does not hold this to be true,

it "notes that Courts of Appeals have suggested it."

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

25

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Forum

[Vol. 1: 2

suggested that the subcontracting provisions in question here would not
be enforceable by picketing.160
It is submitted that the decision of the Court in Woelke & Romero
is perfectly proper. As will be demonstrated, the Court's analysis holds
up under close scrutiny. Moreover, this decision should help to bring
some needed stability to labor relations in this industry.
Legislative History
The Court's decision is based on a simple syllogism, so the validity
of the decision rests on the strength of the premises. The Court found (1)
that this kind of subcontracting clause existed pre-59; (2) that this kind
of clause was either legal pre-59 or, at least, perceived by Congress to be
legal; (3) that Congress did not intend to change the law with regard to
the legality of such clauses; therefore, (4) these clauses are protected by
the construction industry proviso.
As to the proposition that broad, particular union subcontracting
clauses existed pre-59, there can be little argument. 16 1 What isn't clear is
the extent to which such clauses were used in the construction industry. 62 The Supreme Court read the General Counsel's study as establishing that 12% of the contracts studied had union signatory clauses. 163 In
reality, the number could easily be much higher. The General Counsel
found that the "most prevalent" kind of subcontracting clause required
adherence to the "terms and conditions" of the prime contract. 64 If one
of the terms and conditions of the prime contract was a union security
clause, the subcontracting clause could, in effect, become a union signatory clause. In fact, that precise situation arose in Northern California
Chapter, Associated General Contractors (St. Maurice, Helmkamp &
Musser)165 where a combination of a "terms and conditions" subcontracting clause and a union security provision led to a subcontractor not
receiving a contract because it would force union membership on its

160. Id. at 665. The language is less than firm: "as the Court of Appeals held here." Was
the Court afraid to say "correctly held"? See infra notes 270-81 and accompanying text.
161. Even assuming that the Lunden report is inconclusive, the General Counsel's Memorandum on Connell,[LAB. REL. YEARBOOK (BNA) at 295 (1976)], reported the results of his own
survey which showed that 8 of 49 subcontracting clauses reviewed were "particular union"
clauses. Id. at 309.
162. The General Counsel concluded: "From this review of the contracts existing in 1959,
the only clear lesson that emerges is simply that there was no uniformity ..... Id.
163. 456 U.S. at 660 n.12.
164. LAB. REL. YEARBOOK (BNA) at 309 (1976).
165. 119 NLRB 1026,41 L.R.R.M. 1209 (1957), review denied and enforced sub. nom.,
Operating Engineers Local Union 3 v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
834 (1959).
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employees. 66 Thus, it hardly can be argued that subcontracting clauses,
such as those in issue here, were not a significant part of construction
industry labor agreements before 1959.
The Court again seems to be on solid ground with respect to the
legal status of these clauses pre-59. While Sand Door did not expressly
establish their legality, 67 there is no support for the proposition that
these clauses were illegal. Conversely, the Supreme Court correctly cited
Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 v. NLRB 168 which held that
voluntary compliance with a union subcontracting clause did not constitute a violation of §§8(a)(1)(2) or (3) by the employer or §§8(b)(1)(A) or
(2) by the union. 69
The perception of Congress as to the legality of subcontracting
clauses is as clear as Congressional perception ever can be. One petitioner argued that Sand Door held these clauses to be "unenforceable"
and that the term "unenforceable" was used, by legislators, synonymously with "illegal.' 170 This argument, however, seems to be a slender
thread in the face of the gloss on the legislative history of §8(e) previously given by the Supreme Court in National Woodwork Manufactur71
ers Ass'n. v. NLRB :
Section 8(e) simply closed still another loophole. In Local1976,
United Brotherhoodof Carpentersv. Labor Board(Sand Door), 357
U.S. 93, the court held that it was no defense to an unfair labor

practice charge under §8(b)(4)(A) that the struck employer had
agreed, in a contract with the union, not to handle nonunion material. However, the court emphasized that the mere execution of such a
contract provision (known as a "hot cargo" clause because of its

prevalence in Teamsters Union contracts), or its voluntary observance by the employer, was not unlawful under §8(b)(4)(A). Section
166. 119 NLRB at 1053-54.
167. "There is no occasion to consider the invalidity of hot cargo provisions as such." 357
U.S. 93, 107 (1958).
168. 456 U.S. at 659, citing 266 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
169. 266 E2d at 909.
170. See Brief of Oregon-Columbia Chapter, the Associated General Contractors of
America, Inc. (hereinafter "Oregon-Columbia'), at 43, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at
443 (1982). It also argued that OperatingEngineers Local Union No. 3 was presented to some
members of Congress as a decision showing a violation of the Act. Id. at 444. This assertion is
countered in the NLRB's brief: "When the members of the House Labor Committee inquired
about these decisions, the labor consultant to the Committee's minority members reported that
the subcontracting clause had been found lawful by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia." NLRB Brief at 17, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 447 citing LaborManagement Reform Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 3540, H.R. 3302, H.R. 473, and H.R. 4474
before a Joint Subcommittee of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 86th Cong. 1st
Sess. 2368 (1959).
171. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
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8(e) was designed to plug this gap in the legislation by making the
"hot cargo" clause itself unlawful. The Sand Door decision was
believed by Congress not only to create the possibility of damage
actions against employers for breaches of "hot cargo" clauses, but
also to create a situation in which such clauses might be employed to
exert subtle pressures upon employers to engage in "voluntary" boycotts. (Footnotes omitted) 72
Realistically, there would seem to be little purpose to §8(e) if these
clauses were not legal.
The critical inquiry must focus upon the third leg of the syllogism:
Did Congress intend to preserve this state of affairs? The answer to this
question depends on the weight one gives to the remarks of Senator
Kennedy, for even Judge Sneed, who opposed the use of these clauses,
admitted that "Kennedy thought that the proviso would permit subcontracting clauses such as those challenged here." 73 The only reason to
question Marshall's logical conclusion, that the views of Kennedy are
entitled to "substantial weight," 7 4 is that these same remarks previously
had been dismissed by the Supreme Court in Connell as "bare references."1Ts Obviously, the Supreme Court in Woelke found that Connell was
decided in a context sufficiently distinct so that the language of Connell
is inapposite. Perhaps, too, Connell was just a little misleading.
The Collective BargainingRelationship
The characteristic that distinguishes Woelke & Romero from Connell is the presence of a collective bargaining relationship. The Supreme
Court found such a distinction to be sufficient. Strong arguments support the Court's position.
As indicated previously, 176 the union's tactics in Connell were particularly effective because the picketing was not subject to the limits of
§8(b)(7). The Court in Woelke characterized the Connell situation as
"novel" and "foolproof."177 The situation, however, is not quite as simple. Petitioner Oregon-Columbia argued that a union could exert equal
coercive force even in the context of a collective bargaining relationship.178 A union that is certified can insist on a subcontracting clause and

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
No. 16 at

Id. at 634. See also Connell, 421 U.S. at 628.
654 F.2d at 1326.
456 U.S. at 656, n.9.
421 U.S. at 628-29.
See supra notes 19-22, 114-15, 131, 157, 227 and accompanying text.
456 U.S. at 653 n.8.
Petition for Certiorari of Oregon-Columbia at 15, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA)
95 (1982). Petitioners also argued that even unions that do not represent any
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picket to obtain it without regard to §8(b)(7), 179 since §8(b)(7) is only
limited to recognitional picketing.
A response to this argument is suggested by Judge Canby in the en
banc decision.1 80 An employer bargaining with a certified union can
resist economic pressure in the bargaining process by its status as a party
in a position to give something to the union (e.g., higher wages instead of
a subcontracting clause). In this regard, the pressure on an employer in
construction is the same as that which all employers face. A stranger
employer, such as an employer in the position of Connell Construction,
has nothing to trade or gain and, thus, it cannot resist union pressure.
Similarly, Petitioner Pacific Northwest also rejected the distinction
between Connell and the instant case. It argued that §8(b)(7) covered
secondary picketing such as existed in Connell.181 It also cited a General
Counsel Memorandum as suggesting that where an employer has no
unit employees and a union pickets to obtain an 8(f) contract, §8(b)(7)(C)
is violated from the first day. 82 However, the proposition that §8(b)(7)
covers secondary picketing was apparently rejected by the General
Counsel. The antitrust action in Connell was a response to this determination. 183 The proposition that picketing to obtain a §8(f) contract violates §8(b)(7) ab initio is disputed by the Board in its brief, 84 and,
unfortunately, this is one of the questions neither addressed nor
85
answered by the Court.
One final argument regarding §8(b)(7) was raised by the employers
during oral argument before the D.C. Circuit in Schriver. They argued
that even when applicable, §8(b)(7) just wasn't effective because under
Board rulings picketing could easily go on for 75 to 100 days. 86 The
D.C. Circuit's response to that was, quite correctly, that such a problem

employees can engage in informational picketing, even if there is, ultimately, a recognitional

objective. Id. citing Smitley v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 351, 352-53 (9th Cir. 1964) and Barker Bros.
Corp. v. NLRB, 328 .2d431 (9th Cir. 1964).
179. Petition for Certiorari of Oregon-Columbia at 16, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA)
No. 16 at 96.
180. 654 F2d 1301, 1321. See also, NLRB Brief at 34 n.37, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA)
No. 16 at 494 n.37.
181. Reply Brief of Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors,
Inc. (hereinafter "Pacific-Northwest") at 13-15, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at
177-179.
182. Id. citing LAB. REL. YEARBOOK (BNA) at 354 (1979).
183. See the 5th Circuit opinion in Connell, 483 F.2d at 1157-58.
184.

NLRB Brief at 28, IS LAB. LAw REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 488.

185.

"[W]e do not reach the question whether a union may use economic pressure to

obtain a subcontracting agreement. We also do not reach the question whether a union may

picket to obtain a pre-hire agreement." 456 U.S. at 664 n.17.
186. 635 F.2d at 876 n.24.
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was not to be solved by judicially rewriting a "careful statutory scheme
187
established by Congress."'
Aside from the §8(b)(7) ramifications, the collective bargaining relationship is important in other ways. The Act itself is structured to
achieve industrial peace through collective bargaining.188 It is not a vehicle through which strangers may enter into boycott agreements. 89
Petitioner Oregon-Columbia had attempted to counter this asserting that subcontracting agreements outside of collective bargaining rela-

tionships were "commonplace" and part of the bargainink pattern before
1959.190 If this was part of the pre-59 pattern, Connell should have gone
the other way. Since Connell didn't allow bare §8(e) agreements, the
critical factor could (should?) not have been the presence or absence of
the collective bargaining relationship.
A reasonable explanation for the Connell Court's reasoning is
either that it didn't know of these pre-59 skeleton agreements or that it
refused to accept the evidence presented. On these grounds, the Court
couldn't sanction Local 100's position. This, however, does not mean
187. Id. at 876.
188. Section I of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151 (1976), reads in
pertinent part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
189. Arguably, the phrase "or other mutual aid or protection" might encompass naked
§8(e) agreements. But, that is all the more reason why §8(e) agreements within collective
bargaining agreements should be allowed.
190. Orgeon-Columbia Brief at 9-10, 15 LAB. LAw REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 89-90. The
brief quotes the following passage:
...organizing in the building and construction industry both prior to and subsequent
to the 1959 amendments, was and is primarily carried on by building and construction
trades councils on behalf of their constituent craft locals. The building trades agreements proferred are not conventional collective-bargaining agreements, nor is a conventional collective-bargaining relationship sought, but rather an attempt is made to
obtain skeleton agreements (containing little more than subcontracting provisions)
which in turn are augmented by the execution of collective-bargaining agreements by
the individual trade unions, the latter agreements containing provisions governing
wages and other substantive conditions of employment. As the Court observed in
Dallas Building and Construction Trades Council v. N.L.R.B., 396 F.2d 677, 68
LRRM 2019 (C.A.D.C.), at p. 682:
.. Congress intended by means of Section 8(e) to preserve the status quo of bargaining in the construction industry; and in 1959 "umbrella" agreements like the one
proposed here were, as they are today, commonplace, for collective bargaining is
traditionally conducted at several levels in the construction industry..
LAB. REL. YEARBOOK (BNA) at 298, 307 (1974).
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that the Connell Court wouldn't find the presence of a collective bargaining agreement to shelter a subcontracting clause. The language of Con191
nell discusses the lack of a collective bargaining relationship too often.
At best, all petitioner succeeds in accomplishing is to suggest that Connell was incorrectly decided, and that, possibly, a naked §8(e) agreement
is entitled to the protection of the proviso.
The collective bargaining relationship also may be relevant in that it
changes the antitrust considerations involved. In Connell, the Court
noted that the federal policy favoring collective bargaining agreements
192
could not provide a shelter to Local 100's agreement. If the inclusion
of the agreement within a collective bargaining agreement avoids an
antitrust problem, then the Court has less of a need to read the proviso
to §8(e) narrowly. 93 This analysis, perhaps, begs the question since not
all collective bargaining provisions are above antitrust scrutiny, and it
clause's validity under §8(e)
may not be so clear that a subcontracting
194
scrutiny.
eliminates antitrust
Jobsite Restrictions
As indicated by the Supreme Court, petitioners were willing to
concede that the presence of the subcontracting clause in a collective
bargaining context was significant (i.e. necessary) but they argued that it
was not a sufficient condition. Specifically, they argued that: (1) the
proviso to §8(e) was a partial substitute for the Denver Building Trades
problem; (2) the problem in Denver was jobsite friction created by hav191. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. The Connell Court noted the absence
of the collective bargaining relationship at three points, 421 U.S. at 625-26, 633, 635. Respondent Unions also argued that the references at 631 n.10 in Connell, where the Court distinguished two Board decisions, are also distinctions based on the presence of a collective bargaining relationship. Unions' Brief at 32-33, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 544-45.
192. 421 U.S. at 626.
193. This is not to suggest that the presence of a collective bargaining agreement necessarily would immunize the subcontracting clause from antitrust scrutiny. See United Mine Workers
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664-65 (1965).
194. Judge Stewart, in his dissenting opinion in Connell, suggested that a lawful §8(e)
agreement should be immune from antitrust scrutiny. 421 U.S. at 648 n.8. But in Consolidated
Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n. Inc., 641 F.2d 90 (3d. Cir. 1981) the court, trying
desperately to work out a complicated problem involving an alleged §8(e) violation and the
antitrust laws, said "[W]hile the court owes no particular deference to the Board's antitrust
views, its own views on the reach of the antitrust laws cannot but be enlightened by the Board's
opinion on whether the [contract clauses in question] are lawful as a matter of labor law." Id. at
94. This seems equivocal. However, the Court later stated,
Finally, we cannot close our eyes to the reality that although one count of the complaints before us on this appeal charges violations of the antitrust laws, in a very real
sense the labor law questions are primary, while the antitrust law questions are, if not
secondary, at least dependent.
Id. at 95.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

31

Hofstra Labor
and
Employment
Iss. 21:[1983],
Art. 1
Hofstra
Labor
Law ForumLaw Journal, Vol. 1, [Vol.
2

ing union and nonunion workers side by side on a project; and (3) a
subcontracting clause should be valid only to the extent that it alleviates
that problem. The petitioners concluded that the clauses in question,
which were operable even if no union employees were working for the
contractor or on the site, were overly broad and beyond the protection
of the proviso. Petitioners support this reasoning by citing Connell as
well as numerous other cases where the problem of jobsite friction is
referred to. 195
The petitioner's argument was attacked in several ways. First, it was
argued that such interpretation would entail site by site negotiations, or,
at least, site by site policing to determine if a union member was present
along with nonunion workers. 96 The practical difficulties of this requirement may not be substantial since unions already are required to establish the presence of a union employee of a primary contractor in order to
engage in common situs picketing. 197 In addition, union employees often
may be able to notify the unions if nonunion workers are at the site.
However, the unions already have a burdensome policing problem,198
and any additional policing merely exacerbates their difficulties.
The more critical response to the petitioner's argument is that the
Denver decision treated a subcontractor as a neutral party, thus making
the union's picketing against the general contractor secondary. The subcontractor, though, is hardly a neutral.
The Denver "friction" problem was just the issue raised by Justice
Douglas in his dissenting opinion in that case. 199 The larger problem is
that unions in construction, unlike those in industry, are prevented from
picketing at the site of the labor dispute. 0
The other problem with the petitioners' Denver argument is that it
too narrowly construes Congressional intent regarding the scope of the
proviso to §8(e). It assumes that Congress in enacting the proviso only
cared about a problem with Denver regarding friction at the jobsite.
Subcontracting clauses do more:

195. For the complete statement of this argument with appropriate citations see OregonColumbia Brief at 4-7, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 84-87; Woelke & Romero Brief
at 30-33, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 294-97; Amicus Brief of Associated General
Contractors, Inc. at 9-10, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 223-24.
196. See Judge Canby's discussion, 654 F.2d at 1321-22.
197. See Carpenters Council of Milwaukee, 196 NLRB 487, 490 (1972); Local 519, Journeymen v. NLRB, 416 F2d 1120, 1124-26 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
198. Witness the fact that Donald Schriver, Inc. signed a contract with a union-only
subcontracting clause in June of 1972, and successfully ignored that provision until May of
1975. Donald Schriver, 239 NLRB 264,265,99 L.R.R.M. 1593, 1594.
199. 341 U.S. at 692.
200. See Uoions' Brief at 16-18, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 528-30.
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By permitting contract clauses requiring that all construction
site work be performed by contractors who are bound to honor the
terms of the applicable area-wide agreement with the appropriate
union, the construction industry proviso seeks to preserve the means
that unions and employers in that industry had adopted for insuring

not only that labor relations on particular job sites are harmonious
(see subpoint b, infra) but also that the pool of workers represented

by the union will enjoy the opportunities for regular employment
and the continuity in wages, fringe benefits, and other terms and

conditions of employment enjoyed by employees in more stable
industries. 201

ParticularUnion Clauses
The petitioners also argued that particular union clauses should not
be allowed since they grant the unions in question a monopoly. Furthermore, the petitioners contended that the unions already possessed sufficient protection for legitimate union needs through the use of union
standards provisions. 2 2 Support for this proposition can be found in the
20 3
language of Connell.
As the Supreme Court recognized, however, there really aren't
many competing unions in construction. 20 4 Moreover, as indicated pre-

201. Id. at484.
202. See, e.g., Oregon-Columbia Brief at 13-14, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16, at
93-94.
203. The Court stated:
The agreements with general contractors did not simply prohibit subcontracting to
any nonunion firm; they prohibited subcontracting to any firm that did not have a
contract with Local 100. The union thus had complete control over subcontract work
offered by general contractors that had signed these agreements. Such control could
result in significant adverse effects on the market and on consumers-effects unrelated
to the union's legitimate goals of organizing workers and standardizing working conditions. For example, if the union thought the interests of its members would be served
by having fewer subcontractors competing for the available work, it could refuse to
sign collective-bargaining agreements with marginal firms. Cf. Mine Workers v. Pennington, supra. Or, since Local 100 has a well-defined geographical jurisdiction, it
could exclude "traveling" subcontractors by refusing to deal with them. Local 100 thus
might be able to create a geographical enclave for local contractors, similar to the
closed market in Allen Bradley, supra.
421 U.S. at 624-25.
204. 456 U.S. at 664 n.15, citing Carpenters Local 15, 240 NLRB 252, 261 (1979). It
should be noted that the Court's reference to "note 17 supra" is an error.
A situation not discussed by the Supreme Court or raised in any of the cases is whether a
union specific contracting clause for non-unit work is permissible. Both the "friction" argument
(see supra note 48 and accompanying text) and the "maintenance of a pool of union work"
argument (see supra note 129 and accompanying text) would fail. Yet a union might prefer one
of two competing unions for other reasons such as respect for jurisdictional lines.
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viously,205

particular union clauses were part of the pre-59 pattern.

Finally, particular union clauses are necessary to maintain the continuity
206
of pension and fringe benefits.
Top-Down Organizing

Petitioners further argued that allowing the subcontracting clauses
without the limitations suggested would result in the kind of top-down
organizing pressure that the Connell Court said Congress intended to
eliminate in 1959.207 Connell, they asserted, struck the balance between
§7 rights 2O8 and the problem of jobsite friction. Similarly, in NLRB v.
205.
206.

See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
As Respondent Unions argued:
In addition to the obvious purpose of assuring the union employees will have jobs
in the future at all, there is an additional interest arising from the form of fringe
benefits provided in the constructon industry. Typically, benefits are provided through
contributions to a trust fund jointly administered by the union and employer parties to
a collective bargaining agreement, pursuant to §302(c)(5) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.
§186(c)(5). Section 302 forbids payments into such funds except if "specified in a
written agreement with the employer" and also provides that any funds contributed
must be "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer ...."
See, e.g., NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981). Thus potential employees
of an employer who has promised to provide fringe benefits in this manner have
an interest in protecting the integrity of the economic aspects of the collective bargaining agreement which goes beyond a promise not to engage a subcontractor who
pays less in total wages and benefits than the monetary equivalent provided in the
collective bargaining agreement of the primary contractor. For, a subcontractor who
is not a signatory to a written agreement is forbidden by §302 from paying into
the trust fund, and therefore, the fund from which the employees covered by the
agreement will later draw their benefits will have less money available than if the
subcontractor was also obliged to pay into the fund. Further, the alternative used in
Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401-permitting subcontracting to a nonsignatory subcontractor but requiring the primary contractor then to make contributions measured
by the hours worked by the subcontractor's employees-solves the problem only in
part. The flow of contributions into the fund is maintained, but the union employees
who would otherwise have worked on the project are not themselves credited with
hours worked for purposes of later benefit calculation; and the employees of the
subcontractor,even if they turn out to be the same individuals, are "ineligible for trust
fund benefits based on ... work performed for [a nonsignatory subcontractor]."
Walsh, 429 U.S. at 407.
Union Brief at 21-22 n.ll, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 533-34 n.ll. See also,
NLRB Brief at 24-25, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 484-85. Cf. Oregon-Columbia
Reply Brief at 7, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 601.
207. 421 U.S. at 631-32 where the Court stated: "[l]f we agreed with Local 100 ... our
ruling would give construction unions an almost unlimited organizational weapon ... It is
highly improbable that Congress intended such a result. One of the major aims of the 1959 Act
was to limit "top-down" organizing campaigns .. "
208. National Labor Relations Act, §7, 29 U.S.C. §157 (1976), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
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Iron Workers (Higdon),2 9 the Supreme Court analyzed the unique needs
of the construction industry and determined, albeit in the §8(f) context,
that "Congressional concern about coerced designations of bargaining
agents did not evaporate as the focus turned to the construction industry
,210

If the Court's response in Woelke is that some top-down pressure is
implicit in §8(e) then the Court's only question of how much pressure
should be tolerated seems correct.21' First, the Higdonlanguage relies on
Connell, and Connell can be distinguished on the grounds that the union
there had an "unlimited" weapon. Thus the balance struck in Connell is
not necessarily appropriate where other limits on top-down organizing
are present. 21 2 In addition, the §7 rights of nonrepresented employees to
refrain from joining a union have to compete with the rights of unionized employees trying to preserve the benefits that they have fought for
and won.
One also must question the petitioners' assumption that nonunion
workers have freely chosen not to be represented. Employees may tolerate nonunion status for lack of knowledge, or because the time, expense,
and job jeopardy involved in organizing an employer may seem overwhelming. It appears equally valid to assume that many employees
would welcome the unionization of their employer. 213 In fact, §8(f),
enacted as part of Landrum-Griffin in 1959, was predicated on the
notion that unions were the choice of a significant number of workers in
214
construction.
PART IV
SubcontractingClauses In 8(1) Agreements
The decision in Woelke & Romero clearly indicates that the presence of a collective bargaining relationship will bring a subcontracting

other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
209. 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
210. Id. at 347-48.
211. Unless the proviso is rendered completely meaningless, some top-down pressure is
implicit.
212. And, as indicated previously, the focus on the "friction" problem cited in Connell
was too narrow. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
213. This is not to suggest that unionization is an unmixed blessing. Union membership is
expensive. Local 701's initiation fee is $1,000, and dues amount to $96/quarter. OregonColumbia Reply Brief at 16 n.24, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 610 n.24.
214. See NLRB Brief at 23 n.24, 15 LAB. LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 483 n.24.
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clause within the protection of the construction industry proviso. The
Court, though, does not fully explore the issue of what constitutes a
collective bargaining relationship. Specifically, a question arises as to
whether a prehire agreement, i.e., an agreement authorized by §8(f), is a
sufficient collective bargaining relationship. This question is of some
significance since prehire agreements are common in the industry.
In Los Angeles Building and Construction rades Council; Local
1497, United Brotherhoodof Carpenters(DonaldSchriver, Inc.),215 the
Board examined the scope of the phrase and took a rather broad view.
Schriver involved two different labor disputes. In one, a general contractor (Donald Schriver, Inc.) had entered into an agreement with the Los
Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council in 1972 which contained an automatic renewal provision and incorporated the Master
Labor Agreement between the Council and various employer associations. 216 Apparently, Schriver never abided by the union subcontracting
provisions, nor did its employees ever designate the Council or any
affiliate as its bargaining representative. 2 17 In 1975, Local 1497 decided
to enforce the contract. It demanded that Schriver execute the 1974-77
Master Labor Agreement (to which, it claimed, Schriver was legally
bound). Schriver attempted to negotiate different terms. The Trades
Council refused and threatened suits and picketing.
The other labor dispute involved a framing subcontractor, Topaz
Contracting & Development Co., Inc., who previously had never been a
party to an agreement with the Carpenters. In 1977, Topaz was
approached at a project where it employed carpenters by a union representative, who wanted Topaz to agree to the Carpenters' Master Labor
Agreement. Topaz was willing to sign a union agreement limited to the
project in question, but not one binding it generally. The union refused
this offer and picketed. 21 8
In both cases, the Board found that there was a sufficient collective
bargaining relationship to distinguish the situation from Connell. The
Board found that Schriver had never repudiated the collective bargaining relationship that it clearly had with the Carpenters since 1972.
Schriver merely desired to negotiate different terms. 219 With regard to
Topaz, the Board found the attempt to enter into a "complete" contract
(one setting forth wages and other conditions of employment) was suffi215.
216.
217.
Schriver's
218.
219.

239 NLRB 264,99 L.R.R.M. 1593 (1978).
Id. at 265, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1595.
Id. The Board noted that there was no indication that the unions were aware of
projects.
Id.
Id. at 268, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1598.
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cient.220 Thus, the subcontracting provisions in the contracts sought
were, by themselves, within the proviso to §8(e).
The Board rejected any distinction based on the fact that these were
22 2 The Board found nothing
"8(f)221 collective bargaining relationships."
in Connell to suggest a contrary conclusion, 223 and it reasoned that the
protection of the construction industry proviso should be coordinated
with contracts that are authorized for the industry. 224
The Board's position on the §8(f) issue was affirmed by the D.C.
Circuit in its decision in Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB.2-2 Judge

Edwards, writing for the unanimous court, again started with the
proposition that Connell itself was not dispositive, in that the union in

220. Id.
221. 29 U.S.C. §158(1) (1976). Section 8(f) provides:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this section for
an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to make an
agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be
engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor organization of which
building and construction employees are members (not established, maintained, or
assisted by any action defined in section 8(a) of this Act as an unfair labor practice)
because (I) the majority status of such labor organization has not been established
under the provisions of section 9 of this Act prior to the making of such agreement, or
(2) such agreement requires as a condition of employment, membership in such labor
organization after the seventh day following the beginning of such employment or the
effective date of the agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such agreement requires the
employer to notify such labor organization of opportunities for employment with such
employer, or gives such labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified applicants
for such employment, or (4) such agreement specifies minimum training or experience
qualifications for employment or provides for priority in opportunities for employment based upon length of service with such employer, in the industry or in the
particular geographical area: Provided,That nothing in this subsection shall set aside
the final proviso to section 8(a)(3) of this Act: Providedfurther, That any agreement
which would be invalid, but for clause (I) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a
petition filed pursuant to section 9(c) or 9(e).
This proviso allows the so-called "prehire" agreement whereby a union can enter into an
agreement with an employer in construction even before the employer has any employees to be
represented. See generally, articles cited after NLRB Local 103, Iron Workers, note 1I, supra.
222. Id. at 269, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1598-99.
223. In fact, the Board found that the Court in Connell hinted that a §8() relationship
was sufficient:
Thus, in rejecting an argument that the Board had previously approved general
subcontracting agreements with "stranger" employers in B. & J. Investment Company,
the Court speculated that the employer and union, rather than strangers, "may have
... [had] a prehire contract under Sec. 8(f)." Moreover, the Court referred to §8(f)
prehire contracts as a "special consideration" that Congress gave to organizational
campaigns of unions in the construction industry. (421 U.S. at 632.)
224. The Board was not concerned about the use of §8(f) contracts as an organizational
weapon in that §8(b)(7)(C) has been construed to limit picketing for recognition in a §8(1)
context and §8(b)(4)(B) limits picketing to enforce a §8(f) agreement. Id. at 270.
225. 635 F.2d at 876 (1980).
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Connell expressly repudiated any interest in representing Connell's
employees. This repudiation of any representational interest was critical
to avoid the picketing limitations of §8(b)(7). 226 As a result of the
absence of any §8(b)(7) limitation, the Supreme Court in Connellfeared
that an interpretation of §8(e) sanctioning these agreements would subject Connell, and others in a similar situation, to unlimited picketing.
Employees of other contractors would also be subjected to unlimited
top-down organizing. Judge Edwards reasoned that the inclusion of a
subcontracting clause in the context of a §8(f) bargaining relationship
was critically distinguishable from Connell since the unions' ability to
picket, and to pressure a contractor, would be subject to the "stringent"
limitations of §8(b)(7).22 7
This position was also supported, argued Judge Edwards, by the
legislative history to §8(f). That history makes it clear that §8(f) was
needed in construction because of the short-term employment relationships, the need for contractors to bid jobs before workers are employed,
and the impracticability of elections in the industry.228 Therefore:
[It] would make little sense to conclude that this necessary and most
common type of collective bargaining relitionship in the construction industry specifically fecognized and authorized by Congress, is
not a "collective-bargaining relationship" as the term is used in
Connell.
There is no reason why Congress would protect subcontracting
agreements in the construction industry under §8(e), and at the same
time prohibit the most common and possibly the only effective
means by which such an agreement may be obtained.22 9
The argument that §8(f) agreements are not fully enforceable, 230 as are
traditional §9(a) collective bargaining agreements, was found to be
irrelevant. 231 What was considered critical was that §8(f) relationships
prevent a union from "sidestepping" §8(b)(7), and from being able to
"apply unlimited secondary pressure on nonunion subcontractors."2 32

226. Id. at 873.
227. Id. at 873-74.
228. Id. at 874.
229. Id. at 874-75.
230. In NLRB v. Local 103, Ironworkers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978), the Supreme court held
that the duty to honor a §8(f) agreement was "contingent on the union's attaining majority
support at the various construction sites." Id. at 345.
231. 635 F.2d at 875.
232. Id.
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We do not have a definitive answer to the question of whether §8(f)
agreements come within the protection of the construction industry proviso because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Schriver.233 There is
language in Woelke & Romero, nevertheless, which suggests that the
Supreme Court would agree with the D.C. Circuit's decision in Schriver.
To begin with, the Supreme Court does refer to Schriver as a
decision Which supports the Court's conclusion on the basic question of
whether subcontracting clauses within collective bargaining relationships
are valid under the construction industry proviso.23 4 More importantly,
the Court directly analyzes the §8(f) contract in response to the suggestion that allowing broad subcontracting clauses would have too great
235
a top-down organizing effect.
The Court suggests that §8(f) protects the subcontractors from
some of the potential harm of a subcontracting clause. Even if a traditionally nonunion subcontractor signs a union agreement in order to get
work on a project where the general contractor has agreed to a union
subcontracting agreement, the subcontractor can walk away from the
§8(f agreement after the project is over and there are no longer any
union employees.
Extending that logic, the contractor who negotiates the subcontracting clause in the context of the §8(f) agreement is not as locked into
the clause because it is not as tied to a §8(f) agreement as it is to a full §9
collective bargaining relationship. There are so many unanswered questions about the nature and effect of an §8(f) agreement, though, that one
cannot rely too heavily on the Schriveropinion as enunciating the definitive word.
It is not clear, for example, exactly what constitutes a §8(f) relationship. The Board originally held that §8(f) applied only to initial attempts
to establish a collective bargaining relationship, 236 and successive prehire
agreements have been treated as full-fledged collective bargaining agreements. 237 Recent decisions suggest that §8(f) agreements do not ripen
into binding collective bargaining agreements unless the union demonstrates its majority status at each site where it seeks to enforce the
agreement. 238 The question of whether one may picket to obtain a §8(1)
agreement was expressly left open in Woelke, 239 yet there is certainly

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

451 U.S. 994 (1981).
456 U.S. 645, 652 n.6.
Id. at 664.
Bricklayers & Masons Local 3, 162 NLRB 476, 64 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1966).
Haberman Construction Co., 236 NLRB 79, 99 L.R.R.M. 1221 (1978).
See, e.g. NLRB v. Haberman Construction Co., 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981).
456 U.S. at 664 n.17.
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language in Higdon which suggests that the Court will not countenance
coerced §8(f) agreements. 240

There is also uncertainty as to whether §8(f) agreements are
enforceable in any way. Higdon clearly holds that picketing to enforce

these agreements is subject to §8(b)(7), and that these agreements can be
freely repudiated by an employer. The Circuit Courts, nevertheless, have
split on the issue of whether a §301241 suit for breach of these agreements
is permissible. 242
Until all of these questions are resolved, one is left with the Schriver

decision which holds that a §8(f) relationship can shelter a subcontracting agreement because §8(f) agreements were specifically sanctioned in
1959 to fit the needs of the industry. These agreements were, thus,
intended to dovetail with the proviso which was concurrently drafted to
accommodate the industry.

240. Although the issue of Higdon was the legality of picketing to enforce a §8(f) agreement, the Court stated, in passing:
Congress was careful to make its intention clear that prehire agreements were to
be arrived at voluntarily, and no element of coercion was to be admitted into the
narrow exception being established to the majority principle. Representative Barden,
an important House floor leader on the bill and a conferee, introduced as an expression of legislative intent Senator Kennedy's explanation the year before of the voluntary nature of the prehire provision:
Mr. Kennedy: I shall answer the Senator from Florida as follows-and it is my
intention, by so answering, to establish the legislative history on this question: It was
not the intention of the committee to requireby section 604(a) the making of prehire
agreements,but, rather,to permit them; nor was it the intention of the committee to
authorize a labor organizationto strike, picket, or otherwise coerce an employer to
sign a prehireagreement where the majority statusof the union had not been established. The purpose of this section is to permit voluntary prehire agreements. 105
Cong. Rec. 18128 (1959); 2 Leg. Hist. 1715.
The House Conference Report similarly stressed that 'Nothing in such provision
is intended ... to authorize the use o f force, coercion, strikes, or picketing to compel
any person to enter into such prehire agreement.' H. R. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess., 42 (1959); 1 Leg. Hist. 946.
434 U.S. 335, 348 n.10.
241. 29 U.S.C. §185 (1976).
242. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that enforcement of §8(f) contracts via
suits under §301 is contingent on a showing that the union attained majority support. Baton
Rouge Building and Construction Trades Council v. E.C. Schafer Construction Co., 657 F2d
806 (5th Cir. 1981), Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72 (1982) rev'g 642 F.2d 1302 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). Four other Circuit courts have allowed §301 actions for obligations due prior to an
employer's repudiation of a contract without any need to show a union majority at the time in
question. Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 667 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. 3508 (1982); Washington Area Carpenter's Welfare Fund v. Overhead Door Co., 681
F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1982); Contractors Health & Welfare Plan v. Associated Wrecking Co., 638
F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1981); New Mexico Council of Carpenters v. Mayhew Co., 640 F.2d 215
(10th Cir. 1981).
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Picketing To Obtain Subcontracting Clauses
One issue expressly left open by the Supreme Court in Woelke was
whether picketing to obtain a lawful subcontracting clause was proscribed by §8(b)(4)(A). 243 Neither Woelke nor the General Counsel had
raised this question before the Board; they had alleged a violation of
§8(b)(4)(A) because the picketing had been to secure an agreement
"prohibitedby section §8(e)."2 44 Under §10(e) of the Act, 245 the Court of
Appeals was without jurisdiction to consider an issue not raised before
the Board, unless excused by "extraordinary circumstances."246 The
Supreme Court refused to find such extraordinary circumstances, 247
248
despite its conclusion that the Board had, in fact, decided the issue.
It is not clear whether the Board did reach this question. The issue,
as stated by the Board, did not encompass the question of §8(b)(4)'s
application to a lawful §8(e) agreement. 249 Nor did the Board discuss the
§8(b)(4) question in the context of a lawful subcontracting agreement in
the text of its decision. The Supreme Court has read much into the
Board's final conclusion of law: "respondents have not violated the Act
in any other manner."25 0
Assuming that the Supreme Court is correct in finding that the
Board did decide the issue, its decision not to find "extraordinary circumstances" is amply supported by precedent. 25 1 A decision to find extraor-

243. 456 U.S. 645, 666.
244. 239 NLRB 241,99 L.R.R.M. 1580 (1978). Emphasis added. Nor was the issue raised
in Pacific Northwest since the agreement there was voluntarily entered into. 239 NLRB 274,
275, 99 L.R.R.M. 1589, 1589-90.
245. 29 U.S.C. §160(e) (1976).
246. Id.
247. "\Voelke could have objected to the Board's decision in a petition for reconsideration
or rehearing. The failure to do so prevents reconsideration of the question by the Courts."456
U.S. at 666.
248. Id. at 666; citing 239 NLRB at 251, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1588.
249. 239 NLRB at 242, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1582. The Board's position was affirmed by a
limited en banc court in Pacific Northwest, 654 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981). Judge Canby, writing
for the majority, noted that the legislative history was "in conflict," but he concluded that the
language of §8(b)(4)(ii)(A) supplied the answer by "negative implication" in that it only prohibited coercing a person into entering a prohibited agreement. Id. at 1323.
250. Petitioner Woelke contended that the issue was raised during consolidated argument
before the Board. Woelke Reply Brief at 7, 15 LAW LAB. REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 567.
251. See, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Quality Manufacturing
Co., 420 U.S. 276, 281 n.3 (1975) where the Court also considered the failure to move for
reconsideration, rehearing or reopening critical. See also NLRB v. District 50, United Mine
Workers, 355 U.S. 453, 463-64 (1958); NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. 318, 322
(1961); Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 311-12 n.10 (1979).
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dinary circumstances, though, could also have been justified here. 5 2 As
will be discussed, infra, the General Counsel had taken the position that
§8(b)(4) is not violated by picketing to secure a lawful subcontracting
agreement. No complaint will be issued charging a §8(b)(4) violation
under these circumstances and the issue could continually escape review.
Since the Supreme Court has essentially ducked this issue,25 3 and
since the Court may not soon get another opportunity to deal with it, the
position of the Board and the Courts of Appeal on this question will
control. It is appropriate therefore, to review, briefly, the position taken
by the Board and the Circuit Courts on the relationship between §8(b)(4)
and §8(e).
The Board, in Construction, Production & Maintenance Laborers
Union, Local 383 (Colson & Stevens Construction Co.),2 54 originally
took the position that §8(b)(4)(A) was violated by picketing to secure a
subcontracting agreement protected by the construction industry proviso. In Colson & Stevens, the union had attempted to obtain a subcontracting agreement that, if complied with, would have forced the termination of existing contracts. The Board found that under pre-59 law, such
picketing would have as "an object" the forcing of the employer to cease
doing business with another, and would therefore be in violation of
§8(b)(4)(A). 255 The Board read Sand Door25 6 as implicitly agreeing with
the proposition that picketing to obtain a subcontracting clause was as
252 See, e.g., Amcar Division, ACF Industries v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 1344, 1350 n.8 (8th
Cir. 1979) where the court found that the issue had been "implicitly" raised.
253. This is not meant in a perjorative sense. Rather, the point is that the Court has
chosen to avoid a question that it could have legitirihately decided.
254. 137 NLRB 1650, 48 L.R.R.M. 2791 (1962), enforcement denied in relevant part, 323
F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963). See also Local 825, Operating Engineers (Building Contractors Association of New Jersey), 145 NLRB 952, 55 L.R.R.M. 1094 (1964); Local 300, Hod Carriers
Union (Fiesta Pools, Inc.), 145 NLRB 911, 55 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1964); Los Angeles building
Trades Council (Treasure Homes), 145 NLRB 279, 54 L.R.R.M. 1381 (1963); Southern Calif.
District of Laborers (Swimming Pool Gunnite Contractors), 144 NLRB 978,54 L. R.R.M. 1165
(1963); Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council (Stockton Plumbing Co.), 144
NLRB 49,53 L.R.R.M. 1513 (1963); Essex County and Vicinity District Council of Carpenters,
141 NLRB 858,52 L.R.R.M. 1416 (1963); Los Angeles Building & Construction Trades Council
(Interstate Employers, Inc.), 140 NLRB 1249, 52 L.R.R.M. 1215 (1963); Operating Engineers
Union (Sherwood Construction Co.), 140 NLRB 1175,52 L.R.R.M. 1198 (1963). Building and
Construction Trades Council of Orange County (Sullivan Electric Company), 140 NLRB 946,
52 L.R.R.M. 1163 (1963); Local Union 825, Operating Engineers (Nichols Electric Company),
140 NLRB 458, 52 L.R.R.M. 1043 (1963); Building and Construction Trades Council of San
Bernardino, etc. (Gordon Fields), 139 NLRB 236, 51 L.R.R.M. 1493 (1962); Local 60, United
Association of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry (Binnings Construction Co., Inc.), 138
NLRB 1282,51 L.R.R.M. 1182(1962).
255. 137 NLRB at 1651, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1445. Section 8(b)(4)(A) as it existed pre-59 is
now §8(b)(4)(B).
256. 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
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unlawful as picketing to enforce one, since "in both situations the evil
sought to be remedied is the cessation of business relationships by proscribed tactics. 2 57 The Board read the legislative history of the 1959
Amendments as preserving the existing law with regard to "the legality
of a strike to obtain such a contract."25 8
The Court of Appeals disagreed and refused to enforce that part of
the Board's order. 259 Although §8(e) may have been addressed to voluntary agreements, §8(b)(4)(A), which is the part of the Act that prohibits
coercion, outlaws only coercion to enter agreements prohibited by
§8(e).260 The court agreed that the 1959 Amendments were designed to
preserve existing law with regard to picketing to secure §8(e) agreements,
but the court found that existing law allowed such picketing. 261 The
court also rejected the argument that since existing contracts would be
terminated if the subcontracting clause were enforced,. picketing to
obtain such a clause violated §8(b)(4)(B). Reviewing the legislative history, the court concluded:
The clear implication is that only subsection (A) deals with
picketing to secure agreements to cease, and from this follows the
niore rational construction that if subsection (A), which deals direct=
ly with this type of picketing does not make it unlawful 62in a particular case it will not be made unlawful by subsection (B).2
The Board's position was also rejected by every other Circuit that
faced the question. 263 In NortheasternIndian Building and Construction
Trades Council (Centerlivre Village Apartments)264 the Board finally
reversed itself and held that picketing to secure an agreement within the
proviso to §8(e) did not violate §8(b)(4)(A).
The legislative history of the 1959 Amendments lends support to
this position. In Sand Door, the Court held that a hot cargo agreement
was not a valid defense to a charge of secondary picketing. The Court
recognized that the hot cargo agreements themselves might have been
257. 137 NLRB at 1651, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1445.
258. Id. at 1651-52, quoting Senator Kennedy, reprintedin 2 NLRB Leg. Hist. 1433.
259. 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963).
260. Id. at 424.
261. Id. at 425.
262. Id. at 426-27.
263. Essex County and Vicinity District Council of Carpenters and Millwrights v. NLRB,
332 F.2d 636 (3d. Cir. 1964); Orange Belt District Council of Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d
534, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Building and Construction Trades Council of San Bernadino, 328
F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Construction, Production & Maintenance Laborers Union, Local
383, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1965); Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers v. Hardy Corp., 332 F.2d 682
(5th Cir. 1964).
264. 148 NLRB 845, 57 L.R.R.M. 1077 (1964).
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coerced. 265 Section 8(e) was designed to deal with the problem of voluntary agreements not found unlawful per se in Sand Door.266 Proponents
of Landrum-Griffin (which would have outlawed all hot cargo agreements) argued that changes were needed to prevent coerced agreements.267 When §8(b)(4)(A) was adopted by the Conferees [linking its
prohibitions to §8(e)], it represented a compromise analogous to the one

involving the proviso to §8(e) and left the law intact. 268 Unfortunately,
the status of the law and the perception of that status is just not conclusive. 269 It cannot be said, therefore, that the decisions relying on the
language of §8(b)(4)(A) are improper, and for now there is agreement

that picketing to obiain lawful subcontracting agreements is permissible.
Picketing To Enforce SubcontractingAgreements

Another issue which arises in the discussion of subcontracting agreements is their enforceability. Specifically, can they be enforced by picket-

ing or other coercive tactics. This issue was mentioned only in passing by
the Supreme Court in Woelke & Romero because it was not specifically
raised by any of the parties. The issue, though, had been raised and fully
discussed in International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 701
(Pacific Northwest Chapterof the Associated Builders & Contractors,
Inc.),270 one of the companion cases to Woelke.
In PacificNorthwest, the Board was asked to determine the effect of

an intertwined self-help enforcement provision 271 on an otherwise valid
§8(e) subcontracting clause. The Board reviewed the legislative history of
§8(e) and found it to be clear that even lawful secondary clauses could

265. 357 U.S. 93, 106.
266. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
267. See (statement of Rep. Griffin), reprinted in 2 NLRB Leg. Hist. 1523, and (statement
of Rep. Rhodes), reprinted in 2 NLRB Leg. Hist. 1581.
268. Senator Kennedy stated that "it was not intended to change the law.., with respect
to the legality of a strike to obtain such a contract." 2 NLRB Leg. Hist. 1433.
269. Especially, since the Supreme Court chose not to decide the question.
270. 239 NLRB 274, 99 L.R.R.M. 2333 (1978).
271. The relevant provisions, contained in the collective bargaining agreement provided:
ARTICLE IX
Settlement of Disputes
Section 5. Should the parties involved fail to comply with the findings within five (5)
days after such written notification by either party or fail to comply with any of the
provisions and/or time limits established in this Article, unless mutually agreed to
extend such limits, then all means of arbitration shall be considered exhausted.
Either party may take such action as they deem necessary to enforce the findings
and/or time limits and they shall not be considered in violation of any part of this
Agreement.
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not be enforced by threats, restraints or coercion prohibited by §8(b)(4).2 72
Several of its own prior decisions to that effect were cited.2 73 The Board
found that Article IX of the agreement in question allowed any kind of
self-help to enforce the subcontracting provisions of the contract. It
rejected the union's argument that self-help was expressly authorized
274
only to enforce the provisions of the greivance-arbitration mechanism.
The effect of a self-help provision was also raised in one of the other
companion cases to Woelke, Los Angeles Building and Construction
Trades Council; Local No. 1497, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
(Donald Schriver, Inc.),275 with a slightly different result. Member

ARTICLE X
Strikes and Lockouts
Section 1. Unless otherwise provided herein, it is mutually agreed that there will be no
strikes or lockouts, or cessation of work by either party, for the duration of this
Agreement. All disputes arising under this Agreement shall be submitted to the
procedures for the settlement of disputes as provided in this Agreement and/or any
addendum relating thereto.
Id. at 275, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2333.
272. The Board quoted then Senator Kennedy on the effect of §8(e):
Since the proviso does not relate to section 8(b)(4), strikes and picketing to
enforce the contracts excepted by the proviso will continue to be illegal under section
8(b)(4) ....
It is not intended to change the law with respect to the judicial enforcement of
these contracts... reprintedin 105 Cong. Rec. 16415 (1959) also reprintedin 2 NLRB
Leg. Hist. of the LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at

1433 (1959).
Id. at 277, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2333 quotingSenator Kennedy, S. Doc. No. 51, 86th Cong.
273. Id., citing Muskegon Bricklayers Union #5, Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers
International Union of America (AFL-CIO), (Greater Muskegon General Contractors Assn.)
152 NLRB 360, 59 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1965); Ets-Hokin Corporation, 154 NLRB 839, 60
L.R.R.M. 1051 (1965); Dimeo Construction Co., supra; General Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 982, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America (J.K. Barker Trucking Co.), 181 NLRB 515, 76
L.R.R.M. 1764 (1970); Fresno, Madera, Kings and Tulare Counties Building and Construction
Trades Council (Gage Brothers Construction), 218 NLRB 39, 89 L.R.R.M. 1274 (1975);
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 12, AFL-CIO (Robert E. Fulton), 220
NLRB 530, 90 L.R.R.M. 1615 (1975).
274. The Board reasoned that to hold otherwise would allow unions to "insulate self-help
clauses" by tying them to the grievance machinery when, in reality, the self-help would really be
aimed at the underlying problem, i.e., the enforcement of a secondary agreement. Id. at 278, 99
L.R.R.M. at 2333.
275. 239 NLRB 264, 99 L.R.R.M. 1593 (1978). The provision in question read:
306. Nothing contained in this Agreement, or any part thereof, shall affect or apply
to the Union in any action it may take against any Contractor or subcontractor who
has failed, neglected or refused to comply with or execute any settlement or decision
reached at any step of the grievance procedure or through Arbitration under the terms
of Article V hereof.
See also Id. at 270, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1599.
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Murphy found the provision to be ambiguous and capable of being
construed in a lawful way.276 Chairman Fanning dissented, reiterating his
view that the mere existence of self-enforcement features did not make
the pioviso to §8(e) inapplicable. He also found that the provision in
question merely exempted economic sanctions from the no-strike provi277
sion of the contract.
The Board's decisions on the enforcement issue were affirmed by
both the Ninth Circuit in its en banc decision in Pacific Northwest,2 78
and the D.C. Circuit in its decision in Schriver. 79 The Supreme Court,
although not directly faced with the issue, did state that these "secondary
clauses" may not be enforced "by picketing or other forms of concerted
activity. '280 At this point, one must conclude that extra-judicial attempts
to enforce subcontracting agreements will not be permitted even When
provided for by appropriate language iii the collective bargaining agreement itself.
CONCLUSlOi

The importance of Woelke & Romero is that it, in fact, construes
Connell and lays to rest a critical question left open in Connell. The
message of Woelke is that Connellwas a unique situation which required
a restrictive view of the construction industry proviso to §8(e), but the
construction industry tpfoviso is not to be narrowly construed when
applied in a more traditional collective bargaining context.
In evaluating whether Woelke & Romero was correctly decided, a
distinction must be made. A decision should be both true to law and to
precedent, and be appropriate in a normative sense. Here the decision,
by definition, meets the first requirement. The literal text of §8(e) supports the Court's conclusion. So, too, does precedent; since the Supreme
Court wrote Connell, its view of what Connell says must perforce be
authoritative. This is particularly true since the make-up of the Court
has not changed significantly since the Connell decision.281
Art. V covers the procedure for settlement of grievances and disputes, and
Provides for submission to that procedure of any grievances or disputes arising out bf
the interpretation or application of any of the terms or conditions of the contract.
276. Id. at 270 n.6.
277. Id. at 270 n. 28, noting Member Fanning's previous dissent in Muskegon Bricklayers
Union #5, Bricklayers, Masons and Plasteiers Inernational Union of America (AFL-CIO)
(Greater Muskegon General Contractors Association), 152 NLRB 360, 59 L.R.R.M. 1081
(1965).
278. 654 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1981).
279. 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
280. 456 U.S. 645, 665.
281. The only changes are Justice Steven's replacement of Justice Douglas and Justice
O'Connor's replacement of Justice Stewart.
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As to the normative issue, the answer really depends on one's philosophy and view of labor relations in construction. If 'one believes that
unions are the natural choice of employees (or, at least, that employees
would prefer unilateral union action to unilateral employer action), that
elections in construction are not really practical, and that unionization of
construction is not destined to raise prices and eliminate competition
based on efficiency, the decision in Woelke is correct.
If, on the other hand, one sees unions as a major reason for innecessary escalation of construction costs, then the Court in Woelke has
erred, since its decision will, to some extent, promote uniofnization in
construction.
What is probable, however, is that the decision in Woelke, by itself,
will have only a modest impact on the industry. Despite th6 list of dire
consequences presented by one petitioner, 282 all Woelke does is return
the industry to pre-Connell status. If unions in 1974 could not use the
proviso to §8(e) to dominate construction, there is no reason to believe
that they will now be able to do so. The decision may be more significant
now because there appears to be a trend towards more subcontracting of
work,2 83 and, thus, unions need to be more concerned with negotiating
subcontracting agreements.
The potential impact of the decision will also depend on how it is
treated by the general counsel and the Board. In one set of cases, the
general counsel's office has broadly construed §8(e)'s "employer in construction" language. 284 The cases held that an owner who employed a
construction supervisor and two assistants was "an employer in construction. '285 This decision will allow unions to directly approach and
negotiate union only subcontracting agreements with owners, so long as
they play an active role in the supervision of the project.
One can hope that this decision will have a stablizing effect on labor
relations in the construction industry. Recent Supreme Court decisions
such as Higdon286 and South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627,
InternationalUnion of OperatingEngineers28 7 have sharply curtailed the

282. Pacific Northwest Petition at 25-26, 15 LAW LAB. REPRINTS (BNA) No. 16 at 67-68.
283. See C. BOURDIN & R. LEVITT, UNION AND OPEN-SHOP'CONSTR:UCTIO'N 22 (1982).
284. IUOE, Local 3, Case No. 27-CE-27 and Utah Building & Constrticton Trades
Council, Case No. 27-CE-28. Decision of Mary M. Shanklin, Acting Director, Office of
Appeals, affirming Regional Director's refusal to issue a complaint.
285. This decision may also be justifiable as an illustration of what the Supleme Court in
Connell meant when it said that §8(e) would apply "to common-sittis relationships on particular
jobsites as well." 421 U.S. 616, 633.
286. 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
287. 425 U.S. 800 (1976). The problem created by these two decisions on the stability of
labor relations was the subject of hearings before the House Subcommittee on LaborManagement Relations on March 8, 1983.
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stability of labor relations in the industry by providing construction

companies with the ability to avoid collective bargaining agreements.
The unions have attempted to fight back with antitrust suits and other
weapons. 288 If the Act's goal of industrial peace through collective bar-

gaining is to be effectuated in construction, more decisions like Woelke
& Romero are needed.

288. See, e.g., the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, U.S.
, 51 U.S.L.W.
4139 (1983), where the union sought to impose antitrust sanctions on an employer group for
coercing some construction companies to operate nonunion. While the union lost on the issue of
standing, the case illustrates how the battle has escalated.
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